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ABSTRACT: The Supreme Court’s 2006 decision in eBay v.
MercExchange is widely regarded as one of the most important patent law
rulings of the past decade. Historically, patent holders who won on the merits
in litigation nearly always obtained a permanent injunction against
infringers. In eBay, the Court unanimously rejected the “general rule” that a
prevailing patentee is entitled to an injunction, instead holding that lower
courts must apply a four-factor test before granting such relief. Ten years later,
however, significant questions remain regarding how this four-factor test is
being applied, as there has been little rigorous empirical examination of
eBay’s actual impact in patent litigation.
This Article helps fill this gap in the literature by reporting the results of an
original empirical study of contested permanent injunction decisions in
district courts for a 7.5-year period following eBay. It finds that eBay has
effectively created a bifurcated regime for patent remedies, as operating
companies who compete against an infringer still obtain permanent
injunctions in the vast majority of cases that are successfully litigated to
judgment. In contrast, non-competitors and other non-practicing entities are
generally denied injunctive relief. These findings are robust even after
controlling for the field of patented technology and the particular court that
decided the injunction request. This Article also finds that permanent
injunction rates vary significantly based on patented technology and forum.
Finally, this Article considers some implications of these findings for both
participants in the patent system and policy makers.
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INTRODUCTION

The Supreme Court’s 2006 opinion in eBay v. MercExchange, which held
that prevailing patentees in litigation are not automatically entitled to a
permanent injunction,1 is widely regarded as one of the most significant
patent law decisions of the past decade.2 It has been extensively cited by lower
1.
See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 393–94 (2006) (holding that the
Federal Circuit erred in “articulat[ing] a general rule, unique to patent disputes, that a
permanent injunction will issue once infringement and validity have been adjudged”).
2.
See Colleen V. Chien & Mark A. Lemley, Patent Holdup, the ITC, and the Public Interest, 98
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federal courts,3 and is the subject of numerous law review articles.4 The case
has also spawned a significant transformation in the field of remedies,
reshaping the test for permanent injunctive relief in numerous areas outside
of patent law.5
Despite its perceived importance, however, there has been little rigorous
empirical examination of eBay’s actual impact in patent litigation.6 This is
significant because the eBay decision—which was unanimous—contains two
concurring opinions that express seemingly divergent perspectives regarding

CORNELL L. REV. 1, 8 (2012) (“The Supreme Court’s 2006 decision in eBay represented a sea change
in patent litigation.” (footnote omitted)); Ryan Davis, Top 15 High Court Patent Rulings of the Past 15
Years, LAW360 (July 1, 2015, 8:27 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/674205/top-15-high-courtpatent-rulings-of-the-past-15-years (ranking eBay as the second most important patent law decision since
2000).
3. A recent search of WestlawNext finds that eBay has been cited in over 2000 federal court
opinions. See Citing References for eBay Inc. v. MercExchange L.L.C., WESTLAWNEXT (last visited May 10,
2016); see also Dennis Crouch, Most Cited Supreme Court Patent Decisions (2005–2015), PATENTLY-O (Mar.
11, 2015), http://patentlyo.com/patent/2015/03/supreme-court-cases.html (listing eBay as the
second most cited U.S. Supreme Court patent case of the past decade).
4.
For examples of significant eBay-related scholarship, see generally Andrew BeckermanRodau, The Aftermath of eBay v. MercExchange, 126 S. Ct. 1837 (2006): A Review of Subsequent
Judicial Decisions, 89 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 631 (2007); Michael W. Carroll, Patent
Injunctions and the Problem of Uniformity Cost, 13 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 421 (2007);
Bernard H. Chao, After eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange: The Changing Landscape for Patent Remedies, 9
MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 543 (2008); Chien & Lemley, supra note 2; Eric R. Claeys, The Conceptual
Relation Between IP Rights and Infringement Remedies, 22 GEO. MASON L. REV. 825 (2015); Vincenzo
Denicolò et al., Revisiting Injunctive Relief: Interpreting eBay in High-Tech Industries with NonPracticing Patent Holders, 4 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 571 (2008); Douglas Ellis et al., The
Economic Implications (and Uncertainties) of Obtaining Permanent Injunctive Relief After eBay v.
MercExchange, 17 FED. CIR. B.J. 437 (2008); Mark P. Gergen, John M. Golden & Henry E. Smith,
The Supreme Court’s Accidental Revolution? The Test for Permanent Injunctions, 112 COLUM. L. REV.
203 (2012); John M. Golden, “Patent Trolls” and Patent Remedies, 85 TEX. L. REV. 2111 (2007)
[hereinafter Golden, Patent Trolls]; John M. Golden, Principles for Patent Remedies, 88 TEX. L. REV.
505 (2010) [hereinafter Golden, Principles]; Ryan T. Holte, The Misinterpretation of eBay v.
MercExchange and Why: An Analysis of the Case History, Precedent, and Parties, 18 CHAP. L. REV. 677
(2015) [hereinafter Holte, Misinterpretation of eBay]; Ryan T. Holte, Trolls or Great Inventors: Case
Studies of Patent Assertion Entities, 59 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1 (2014) [hereinafter Holte, Trolls or Great
Inventors]; Sarah R. Wasserman Rajec, Tailoring Remedies to Spur Innovation, 61 AM. U. L. REV. 733
(2012); Doug Rendleman, The Trial Judge’s Equitable Discretion Following eBay v. MercExchange,
27 REV. LITIG. 63 (2007); and Karen E. Sandrik, Reframing Patent Remedies, 67 U. MIAMI L. REV.
95 (2012).
5.
See Gergen et al., supra note 4, at 205 (“[T]he four-factor test from eBay has, in many
federal courts, become the test for whether a permanent injunction should issue, regardless of
whether the dispute in question centers on patent law, another form of intellectual property,
more conventional government regulation, constitutional law, or state tort or contract law.”); see
also Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Demystifying the Right to Exclude: Of Property, Inviolability, and
Automatic Injunctions, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 593, 598–99 (2008) (discussing eBay’s impact
in real and personal property law); Jiarui Liu, Copyright Injunctions After eBay: An Empirical Study,
16 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 215, 218 (2012) (examining “how much the eBay decision has guided,
and should guide, copyright cases”).
6.
See infra Part III.C (discussing the existing empirical work on this subject).
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the availability of permanent injunctions in future patent cases.7 In particular,
it remains hotly contested whether so-called patent assertion entities
(“PAEs”)8—firms who principally exploit their patents through litigation
and/or licensing rather than directly practicing them and who are sometimes
pejoratively referred to as “patent trolls”9—should be able to obtain injunctive
relief.10
This Article helps fill this significant gap in the literature by reporting the
results of an original empirical study of contested permanent injunction
decisions in the federal district courts for a 7.5 year period following eBay,
representing the most in-depth effort to date to assess the post-eBay landscape.
The data in this study reveal that, while the vast majority of patentees still
obtain injunctive relief following eBay, PAEs rarely do.11 This finding remains
robust even after controlling for the field of technology of the infringed
patents and the district court that decided the case.12 Furthermore, PAEs
often cannot establish the type of injury deemed “irreparable” following eBay,

7.
See infra Part III.B.3.
8.
See FED. TRADE COMM’N, THE EVOLVING IP MARKETPLACE: ALIGNING PATENT NOTICE
AND REMEDIES WITH COMPETITION 220 n.21 (2011) (“This report uses the term ‘patent assertion
entity’ [or PAE] . . . to refer to firms whose business model focuses on purchasing and asserting
patents.”); Colleen V. Chien, From Arms Race to Marketplace: The Complex Patent Ecosystem and Its
Implications for the Patent System, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 297, 328 (2010) (explaining that PAEs “are
focused on the enforcement, rather than the active development or commercialization of their
patents,” and noting that PAEs “can be further divided into several types—large-portfolio
companies, small-portfolio companies, and individuals”); see also James Bessen & Michael J.
Meurer, The Direct Costs from NPE Disputes, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 387, 390 (2014) (defining a related
concept, non-practicing entities (“NPEs”), as “individuals and firms who own patents but do not
directly use their patented technology to produce goods or services, instead asserting their
patents against companies that do produce goods and services”).
9.
See In re Packard, 751 F.3d 1307, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (Plager, J., concurring) (“Patent
trolls are also known by a variety of other names: ‘patent assertion entities’ (PAEs), [and] ‘nonpracticing entities’ (NPEs).”). For an informative history of the term “patent troll” and its
malleability, see Kristen Osenga, Formerly Manufacturing Entities: Piercing the “Patent Troll” Rhetoric,
47 CONN. L. REV. 435, 442–45 (2014). See also Edward Lee, Patent Trolls: Moral Panics, Motions in
Limine, and Patent Reform, 19 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 113, 117 (2015) (conducting “the first empirical
study of the use of the term ‘patent troll’ by U.S. media” and finding that “starting in 2006, the
U.S. media surveyed used ‘patent troll’ far more than any other term, despite the efforts of
scholars to devise alternative, more neutral-sounding terms”).
10.
Compare FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 8, at 229 (explaining that when a PAE “seeks
to license broadly, denial of an injunction” may be appropriate), and Mark A. Lemley & Carl
Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1991, 2035–36 (2007) (contending
that a “presumptive right to injunctive relief” should apply for patent holders who compete or
exclusively license to a party that does, with other patentees being subject to a less favorable rule),
with Golden, Patent Trolls, supra note 4, at 2148 (contending that “a categorically discriminatory
rule” against non-practicing patentees “is not needed”), and Richard A. Epstein, The Property Rights
Movement and Intellectual Property, REG. 58, 62 (2008) (criticizing eBay as creating a risk of
“systematic under-compensation during the limited life of a patent[, which] is likely to reduce
the level of innovation while increasing the administrative costs of running the entire system”).
11.
See infra Part V.A.4.
12.
See infra Part V.A.8.
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which is a prerequisite to obtaining a permanent injunction.13 In sum, district
courts appear to have adopted a de facto rule against injunctive relief for PAEs
and other patent owners who do not directly compete in a product market
against an infringer—a rule which, ironically, is in tension with the Supreme
Court’s conclusion in eBay that “the District Court erred in its categorical
denial of injunctive relief” to a non-practicing patentee.14
This Article also evaluates the impact of other considerations on
permanent injunction decisions after eBay. It finds that grant rates vary
significantly by field of technology, with injunctions nearly always granted in
cases involving patented drugs and biotechnology, but much less often for
disputes involving computer software.15 The study also finds that grant rates
differ by district, even after controlling for the propensity of PAE litigants to
file lawsuits in particular courts.16 Furthermore, it assesses whether several
other factors mentioned in the concurring opinions in eBay and the district
court’s decision after remand—such as the patentee’s willingness to license
the patented technology, whether the patented technology covers only a small
component of an infringing product, and a finding that the defendant
willfully infringed the patent—are correlated with injunction decisions.17
Finally, this Article reports the results of a second, related dataset that
explores whether traditionally accepted indicators of patent value are
correlated with injunction decisions.18 Somewhat surprisingly, it finds that
these indicators are not predictive of whether a patentee is likely to receive an
injunction.19
The balance of this Article is organized as follows. Part II provides an
overview of the theoretical distinction between property rules and liability
rules for enforcing legal rights, focusing on their application to intellectual
property (“IP”) rights. Part III traces the historical development of the right
to exclude in patent law. It then analyzes the eBay litigation and concludes
with an overview of the existing literature on eBay’s impact in patent litigation.
Part IV describes the research questions considered in this empirical study
and the methodology used to address them. Part V reports the study’s findings
and assesses their implications for patentees, users of patented technology,
and the patent system and innovation policy more generally. In particular, it
13.
See infra Part V.A.6.
14.
eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 394 (2006); see also MercExchange
L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc. (MercExchange I), 275 F. Supp. 2d 695, 712 (E.D. Va. 2003) (“In the case at
bar, the evidence of the plaintiff’s willingness to license its patents, its lack of commercial activity
in practicing the patents, and its comments to the media as to its intent with respect to
enforcement of its patent rights, are sufficient to rebut the presumption that it will suffer
irreparable harm if an injunction does not issue.”).
15.
See infra Part V.A.2.
16.
See infra Parts V.A.3, V.A.8.
17.
See infra Part V.A.8.
18.
See infra notes 202, 316–19 and accompanying text.
19.
See infra Part V.B.
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considers the impact of widespread denial of injunctive relief on nonpracticing patentees. Part VI concludes.
II.

PROPERTY RULES, LIABILITY RULES, AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY:
AN OVERVIEW

In their landmark article, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability:
One View of the Cathedral, now-Judge Guido Calabresi and A. Douglas Melamed
developed an analytic framework for protecting “entitlements”—the right to
do something, or the right to prevent others from doing something.20 An
entitlement is not self-executing. Rather, the legal system must establish some
mechanism to enforce entitlements.21 Calabresi and Melamed distinguished
between two primary forms22 of protection for an entitlement: property rules
and liability rules.23
Under a property rule, an entitlement can only be taken or transferred
with a property owner’s consent.24 As explained by Calabresi and Melamed,

20.
See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1090 (1972) (“The first issue which
must be faced by any legal system is one we call the problem of ‘entitlement.’ Whenever a state is
presented with the conflicting interests of two or more people . . . it must decide which side to
favor. . . . Hence the fundamental thing that law does is to decide which of the conflicting parties
will be entitled to prevail.”); see also Madeline Morris, The Structure of Entitlements, 78 CORNELL L.
REV. 822, 827–39 (1993) (describing in more detail the allocation and construction of legal
entitlements).
21.
See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 20, at 1090 (“Having made its . . . choice, society
must enforce that choice. Simply setting the entitlement does not avoid the problem of ‘might
makes right’; a minimum of state intervention is always necessary.”).
22.
A third form of protection for entitlements, inalienable entitlements, exists when the
transfer of that entitlement “is not permitted between a willing buyer and a willing seller.” Id. at
1092. For purposes of this Article, inalienable entitlements are not at issue, as patent rights are
freely transferable to others through assignment and licensing. See 35 U.S.C. § 261 (2012)
(noting that patents and patent applications “shall be assignable in law by an instrument in
writing”); Isr. Bio-Eng’g Project v. Amgen, Inc., 475 F.3d 1256, 1264 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (“Under
long established law, a patentee or his assignee may grant and convey to another: (1) the whole
patent, (2) an undivided part or share of that exclusive right, or (3) the exclusive right under the
patent within and throughout a specified part of the United States.”).
23.
Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 20, at 1092. Calabresi and Melamed correctly note
that “[t]he[se] categories are not . . . absolutely distinct.” Id. For instance, if monetary damages—
which usually embody a liability rule—are sufficiently high, they can operate more like a property
rule because potential takers of an entitlement would be deterred from doing so. See Ian Ayres &
Eric Talley, Solomonic Bargaining: Dividing a Legal Entitlement to Facilitate Coasean Trade, 104 YALE
L.J. 1027, 1040–41 (1995) (explaining that with “relatively high damages, potential takers would
be deterred from nonconsensual takings, and the entitlement would be transferred only by
consensual agreement”). Some scholars have criticized the distinction between property rules
and liability rules as having little relationship to the normative judgments embedded in private
law remedies determinations. See Claeys, supra note 4, at 839–40 (contending that “‘Cathedral’style analysis raises normative questions more vexing than is often appreciated,” including
measures of efficiency and initial allocation of resource entitlements to parties).
24.
See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 20, at 1105 (“In our framework, much of what is
generally called private property can be viewed as an entitlement which is protected by a property
rule. No one can take the entitlement . . . unless the holder sells it willingly and at the price at
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“[a]n entitlement is protected by a property rule to the extent that someone
who wishes to remove the entitlement from its holder must buy it from him
in a voluntary transaction in which the value of the entitlement is agreed upon
by the seller.”25 For instance, a property rule would require the user of an IP
right to obtain prior permission from its owner, which the owner would be
free to withhold.26 Thus, the holder of an entitlement protected by a property
rule has the exclusive power to determine its value ex ante.27 Injunctive relief
is the dominant means for enforcing a property rule.28
In contrast, a liability rule exists when another party may violate an
entitlement “if [it] is willing to pay an objectively determined value for it.”29
Thus, under a liability-rule regime, entitlements are protected, “but their
transfer or destruction is allowed on the basis of a value determined by some
[third-party authority] rather than by the parties themselves.”30 For instance,
a liability rule applies when an IP right may be infringed in exchange for a
predetermined royalty rate, as is the case for several compulsory licensing

which he subjectively values the property.”).
25.
Id. at 1092.
26.
See Robert P. Merges, Of Property Rules, Coase, and Intellectual Property, 94 COLUM. L. REV.
2655, 2655 (1994) (“[A] property rule is a legal entitlement that can only be infringed after
bargaining with the entitlement holder.”).
27.
See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 20, at 1092 (explaining that a property rule “lets
each of the parties say how much the entitlement is worth . . . and gives the seller a veto if the
buyer does not offer enough”); see also Richard A. Epstein, A Clear View of The Cathedral: The
Dominance of Property Rules, 106 YALE L.J. 2091, 2091 (1997) (“Because property rules give one
person the sole and absolute power over the use and disposition of a given thing, it follows that
its owner may hold out for as much as he pleases before selling the thing in question . . . .”).
28.
See Merges, supra note 26, at 2655 (calling injunctions “the classic instance of a property
rule”); Henry E. Smith, Property and Property Rules, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1719, 1720 (2004) (“Such
‘property rules’ would include injunctions . . . .”). As my colleague Professor Doug Rendleman
has explained, however, an enjoined party “can violate an injunction and convert the plaintiff’s
[property] right into a cause of action for compensatory contempt, money,” and monetary
remedies are more characteristic of a liability rule. DOUG RENDLEMAN, COMPLEX LITIGATION:
INJUNCTIONS, STRUCTURAL REMEDIES, AND CONTEMPT 128 (2010); see also John M. Golden,
Injunctions as More (or Less) than “Off Switches”: Patent-Infringement Injunctions’ Scope, 90 TEX. L. REV.
1399, 1412–13 (2012) (“When any threat of being found in contempt is realistically limited to a
threat of civil contempt . . . [the] risk of being found in contempt can essentially amount to no
more than a risk of being subjected to heightened but still limited monetary sanctions.”).
29.
Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 20, at 1092.
30.
Id. Eric Claeys has criticized the “liability rule” concept as failing to fully reflect “private
law judgments about wrongs and rights” and thus “eras[ing] some of the stigma associated with”
certain forms of tortious conduct. Claeys, supra note 4, at 845–46; see also Jules L. Coleman & Jody
Kraus, Rethinking the Theory of Legal Rights, 95 YALE L.J. 1335, 1340 (1986) (asserting that because
“liability rules neither confer nor respect a domain of lawful control, liability rules cannot, in this
view, protect rights. . . . The very idea of a ‘liability rule entitlement,’ that is of a right secured by
a liability rule, is inconceivable”).
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provisions in the Copyright Act.31 As a result, “a liability rule denies the holder
of the asset the power to exclude others.”32
There is a sizable body of literature analyzing the normative question of
whether property rules or liability rules are preferable for the enforcement of
IP rights.33 Traditionally, the property rule of injunctive relief “has dominated
the law of intellectual property.”34 Several rationales have been offered in
support of “the strong presumption” of property rules for IP rights.35 First,
unlike most other forms of property (e.g., real property), intellectual property
is non-rivalrous and non-excludable absent effective legal protection.36 This
prevents owners of intellectual property from restricting access to “free riders”
who have not incurred the costs of creation from exploiting it.37 The difficulty

31.
See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 111 (2012) (compulsory licensing of secondary transmission of
television programming by cable systems); id. § 114(d)–(f) (compulsory licensing of certain
digital audio transmissions); id. § 115 (compulsory licensing of previously-released nondramatic
musical works); see also Daniel A. Crane, Intellectual Liability, 88 TEX. L. REV. 253, 259–63 (2009)
(discussing in further detail compulsory licensing provisions in the Copyright Act); Joseph P. Liu,
Regulatory Copyright, 83 N.C. L. REV. 87, 108–22 (2004) (detailing the compulsory licensing
provisions’ depth and scope).
32.
Epstein, supra note 27, at 2091; see also Andrew W. Torrance & Bill Tomlinson, Property
Rules, Liability Rules, and Patents: One Experimental View of the Cathedral, 14 YALE J.L. & TECH. 138,
144 (2011) (“Under a liability rule, the owner of an entitlement is legally powerless to keep it
exclusively for herself.”).
33.
See Mark A. Lemley & Philip J. Weiser, Should Property or Liability Rules Govern
Information?, 85 TEX. L. REV. 783, 784 (2007) (arguing that liability rules are preferable to
traditional property rights in markets where injunctive relief cannot be narrowly tailored);
Merges, supra note 26, at 2664–65 (arguing property rights are generally preferable in protecting
intellectual property); Henry E. Smith, Intellectual Property as Property: Delineating Entitlements in
Information, 116 YALE L.J. 1742, 1799–1806 (2007) (explaining how information costs help
explain why copyright law relies more on liability rights and patent law relies more on property
rights); Stewart E. Sterk, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Uncertainty About Property Rights, 106
MICH. L. REV. 1285, 1304–08 (2008) (arguing that liability rules limit incentives to conduct
searches for the scope of property rights); see also Crane, supra note 31, at 255 (reframing the
“property–liability debate” by focusing more broadly on other rights inherent in intellectual
property).
34.
Ben Depoorter, Property Rules, Liability Rules and Patent Market Failure, 1 ERASMUS L. REV.
59, 61 (2008); see also Balganesh, supra note 5, at 598 (“[T]he right to exclude in the context of
both tangible and intangible property has come to be associated with an entitlement to
exclusionary (injunctive) relief.”); Kenneth W. Dam, The Economic Underpinnings of Patent Law, 23
J. LEGAL STUD. 247, 255 (1994) (“Remedies for infringement of a patent are, with limited
exceptions, those appropriate for property. Injunctions, both permanent and temporary, are
available against infringers on proof of validity and infringement.”).
35.
Merges, supra note 26, at 2667.
36.
Smith, supra note 33, at 1744; see also ROBERT P. MERGES, PETER S. MENELL & MARK A.
LEMLEY, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 2 (6th ed. 2012) (“All
justifications for intellectual property protection . . . must contend with a fundamental difference
between ideas and tangible property. Tangible property . . . is composed of atoms, physical things
that can occupy only one place at a given time. This means that possession of a physical thing is
necessarily ‘exclusive’ . . . . Ideas, though, do not have this characteristic of excludability.”).
37.
See Michael A. Carrier, Cabining Intellectual Property Through a Property Paradigm, 54 DUKE
L.J. 1, 32–33 (2004). For the leading critique of the idea that eliminating free riding is a primary
goal of intellectual property law, see Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding,
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of valuing IP rights is another rationale advanced for a property rule.38
“Because each asset covered by an [IP right] is in some sense unique,” it can
be “difficult for a court . . . to properly value the [IP] right-holder’s loss.”39
However, some scholars have argued in favor of imposing liability rules
on IP rights, at least in certain circumstances.40 One situation where liability
rules may be preferred is when private ordering—for instance, ex ante
licensing under a property rule—would result in an inefficient outcome. This
might occur, for example, if high transaction costs prevent the parties from
reaching an otherwise mutually beneficial agreement regarding the use of IP
rights.41 High transaction costs may exist if numerous parties are involved in
the bargaining process, such as when IP rights to various aspects of a particular
technology are owned by disparate entities.42 These difficulties may be
compounded by the uncertain scope of some IP rights, such as the meaning
of a patent’s claims.43
Holdup is another reason advanced by some scholars for adopting
liability rules.44 Holdup occurs when an IP owner uses the prospect of
83 TEX. L. REV. 1031, 1032 (2005).
38.
See THOMAS F. COTTER, COMPARATIVE PATENT REMEDIES: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS 54 (2013) (“[T]he job of putting a value on patent rights is inherently difficult,
particularly in industries in which the technology itself is rapidly evolving.”); Golden, Patent Trolls,
supra note 4, at 2152 (explaining “[t]he difficulty of assessing [damages] has in fact been one of
the principal rationales for granting permanent injunctions” in patent cases).
39.
Merges, supra note 26, at 2664. One common approach for valuing IP is to compare
“the advantages it confers . . . with the next-best available alternative.” COTTER, supra note 38, at
53–54; see also Christopher B. Seaman, Reconsidering the Georgia-Pacific Standard for Reasonable
Royalty Patent Damages, 2010 BYU L. REV. 1661, 1711–15 (2010) (discussing the role of noninfringing alternatives in determining royalty rates for patent rights).
40.
See Crane, supra note 31, at 254 (“Intellectual property is incrementally moving away
from . . . . a property regime to a liability regime.”).
41.
See Ian Ayres & J.M. Balkin, Legal Entitlements as Auctions: Property Rules, Liability Rules,
and Beyond, 106 YALE L.J. 703, 706 n.9 (1996) (“[L]egal scholars have interpreted Calabresi and
Melamed to be saying that property rules are more efficient when transaction costs are low.”);
Merges, supra note 26, at 2655 (“Ever since Calabresi and Melamed, transaction costs have
dominated the choice of the proper entitlement rule, with a liability rule being the entitlement
of choice when transaction costs are high.”). Collective rights organizations have emerged as one
mechanism to mitigate this problem. See generally Robert P. Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules:
Intellectual Property Rights and Collective Rights Organizations, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 1293 (1996).
42.
See Lemley & Weiser, supra note 33, at 793 (noting “that if a buyer must aggregate rights
from a number of different parties in order to achieve a useful end result, it will have to deal with
a number of different sellers,” thus raising transaction costs).
43.
See JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW JUDGES, BUREAUCRATS,
AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK 46–72 (2008) (arguing that patents fail to provide clear
notice of the scope of patent rights); Greg Reilly, Completing the Picture of Uncertain Patent Scope, 91
WASH. U. L. REV. 1353, 1353 (2014) (“Uncertain patent scope is perhaps the most significant
problem facing the patent system.”); see also Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki
Co., 535 U.S. 722, 731 (2002) (“Unfortunately, the nature of language makes it impossible to
capture the essence of a thing in a patent application.”).
44.
See Mark A. Lemley, Contracting Around Liability Rules, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 463, 468
(2012) (“The biggest risk of applying property rules in IP cases is holdup.”).
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injunctive relief to extract compensation significantly in excess of the IP
right’s economic value.45 Proponents of a liability rule in these situations
assert that “[i]njunction threats often involve a strong element of holdup in
the common circumstance in which the defendant has already invested
heavily to design, manufacture, market, and sell [a] product” that practices
the patented technology.46 At that point, the infringer “would be willing to
pay much more than he rationally would have negotiated ex ante in order not
to pull the product from the shelves.”47 Critics of property rules argue that
holdup operates as a “tax” on new high-tech products, which ultimately
impedes growth rather than promoting innovation.48 Other scholars,
however, have questioned whether holdup is a significant problem on both
empirical and theoretical levels.49
In sum, the theoretical literature has historically favored protecting IP
rights—particularly patent rights—through property rules. But as explained
in more detail in the balance of this Article, eBay represents a significant shift
away from a property rule approach, at least for certain types of patent owners.

45.
See FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 8, at 58 (“Under some circumstances, the grant or
threat of a permanent injunction can lead an infringer to pay higher royalties than it would pay
in a competitive market for a patented invention.”); see also COTTER, supra note 38, at 59
(“[P]atent[ed] holdup involves the strategic use of a patent . . . to extract ex post rents that are
disproportionate to the ex ante value of the invention in comparison with the next-best available
alternative.”); Alexander Galetovic, Stephen Haber & Ross Levine, An Empirical Examination of
Patent Holdup, 11 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 549, 549–50 (2015) (“[T]he patent holdup
hypothesis asserts that patent holders charge licensing royalties to manufacturing firms that
exceed the true economic contribution of the patented technology, thereby discouraging
innovation by manufacturers and hurting consumers.”); Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 10, at 1993
(“[T]he threat of an injunction can enable a patent holder to negotiate royalties far in excess of
the patent holder’s true economic contribution.”).
46.
Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 10, at 1993 (emphasis omitted); see also COTTER, supra
note 38, at 59 (explaining that the strategy of holdup “rests upon the patent owner’s ability to
obtain an injunction against the distribution of the end product, after the costs of designing,
producing, and distributing the end product have been sunk”).
47.
COTTER, supra note 38, at 59; see also Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 10, at 1995–2008
(modeling how a patent holder can exploit the cost of switching technologies to obtain licensing
revenue greater than would have occurred in an ex ante negotiation). The holdup problem is
asserted to be particularly acute for widely-adopted technological standards, where a single patent
owner can use the threat of an injunction to “extract unreasonably high royalties from suppliers
of standard-compliant products and services.” Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 696 F.3d 872,
876 (9th Cir. 2012); see also Mark A. Lemley, Ten Things to Do About Patent Holdup of Standards
(and One Not to), 48 B.C. L. REV. 149, 153–54 (2007).
48.
Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 10, at 1993; see also FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 8, at
26 (explaining that “[a]n injunction’s ability to cause patent hold-up . . . can deter innovation by
increasing costs and uncertainty for manufacturers” and “raise prices to consumers by depriving
them of the benefit of competition among technologies”).
49.
See generally Einer Elhauge, Do Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking Lead to Systematically
Excessive Royalties?, 4 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 535 (2008); Golden, Patent Trolls, supra note 4,
at 2148–60; J. Gregory Sidak, Holdup, Royalty Stacking, and the Presumption of Injunctive Relief for
Patent Infringement: A Reply to Lemley & Shapiro, 92 MINN. L. REV. 714 (2008); see also Galetovic et
al., supra note 45, at 552–54, 570–72 (finding no empirical evidence to support the claim of
holdup for standard-essential patents).
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PATENTS AND THE RIGHT TO EXCLUDE

This Part chronicles the historic right of patentees to a property rule
excluding others from practicing patented inventions. It then analyzes the
eBay litigation and the Supreme Court’s announcement of a four-factor test
to govern the district courts’ equitable power to grant injunctive relief. Finally,
it addresses the existing literature regarding eBay’s impact on the availability
of permanent injunctions in patent litigation.
A. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT
Property rules have long predominated in patent law.50 As Chief Justice
Roberts noted in his concurrence in eBay, since “at least the early 19th
century, courts have granted injunctive relief upon a finding of infringement
in the vast majority of patent cases.”51
The Patent Act of 1790, passed by the First Congress, granted inventors
“the sole and exclusive right and liberty of making, constructing, using and
vending to others to be used, the . . . invention or discovery.”52 The earliest
patent laws provided only for remedies at law—that is, recovery of monetary
damages for infringing conduct.53 Starting in 1819, however, Congress
expressly authorized injunctive relief to preclude future infringement:
[T]he circuit courts of the United States . . . shall have authority to
grant injunctions, according to the course and principles of courts
of equity, to prevent the violation of the rights of any . . . inventors,
secured to them by any laws of the United States, on such terms and
conditions as the said courts may deem fit and reasonable . . . .54
The current statutory language in § 283 of the Patent Act is remarkably
similar, providing that “courts . . . may grant injunctions in accordance with
the principles of equity to prevent the violation of any right secured by patent,
on such terms as the court deems reasonable.”55

50.
See supra note 34; see also Frank H. Easterbrook, Intellectual Property is Still Property, 13
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 108, 109 (1990) (“Patents give a right to exclude, just as the law of
trespass does with real property.”).
51.
eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 395 (2006) (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
52.
An Act to Promote the Progress of Useful Arts, ch. 7, § 1, 1 Stat. 109, 110 (1790).
53.
See 3 WILLIAM C. ROBINSON, THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR USEFUL INVENTIONS § 1082,
391–92 (1890) (“The acts of Congress, prior to 1819, made no provision for any suit in equity
by the owner of a patent, nor for his enjoyment of any form of equitable relief in connection with
his action for damages at common law.”); see also Elizabeth E. Millard, Note, Injunctive Relief in
Patent Infringement Cases: Should Courts Apply a Rebuttable Presumption of Irreparable Harm After eBay
Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C.?, 52 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 985, 992 (2008) (noting that “the earliest
patent statutes provided only for remedies at law”).
54.
An Act to Extend the Jurisdiction of the Circuit Courts of the United States to Cases
Arising Under the Law Relating To Patents, ch. 19, 3 Stat. 481, 481–82 (1819).
55.
35 U.S.C. § 283 (2012).
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Prior to eBay, courts routinely characterized patents as conferring a
property right on their owners.56 In turn, the right to exclude has been widely
viewed as the “hallmark of a protected property interest”57 and “one of the
most treasured strands in an owner’s bundle of property rights.”58 As early as
1852, the Supreme Court declared that the rights conferred by a patent
include “the right to exclude [others] from making, using, or vending the
thing patented, without the permission of the patentee.”59
The Court’s 1908 decision in Continental Paper Bag Co. v. Eastern Paper Bag
Co. confirmed that patents confer the right to exclude others, even if the
patentee itself has not practiced the patent.60 In that case, the patent owner,
Eastern Paper Bag Co. (“Eastern”), had purchased a patent on an improved
machine for making paper bags, but Eastern did not use the improved
machine, nor did it license anyone else to do so, as it feared that a competitor
using the improved machine would erode its profits.61 A competing
manufacturer, Continental Paper Bag Co. (“Continental”), started using a
machine that allegedly infringed on Eastern’s patent.62 The trial court found
Eastern’s patent valid and infringed, and it granted permanent injunctive
relief.63

56.
See, e.g., Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 730
(2002) (explaining that the patent laws provide “a temporary monopoly . . . [which] is a property
right”); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 642
(1999) (noting that patents “have long been considered a species of property”); Dawson Chem.
Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176, 215 (1980) (noting “the long-settled view that the essence
of a patent grant is the right to exclude”); Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386,
415 (1945) (stating that it “has long been settled” that “a patent is property, protected against
appropriation both by individuals and by government”); Wilson v. Rousseau, 45 U.S. (4 How.)
646, 674 (1846) (explaining that “[t]he law has thus impressed upon [a patent] all the qualities
and characteristics of property”). The Patent Act provides that “patents shall have the attributes
of personal property.” 35 U.S.C. § 261 (2012).
57.
Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. at 643.
58.
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 435 (1982); see also
Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979) (describing “the right to exclude” as
“one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as
property”); Lemley & Weiser, supra note 33, at 783 (“The foundational notion of property law is
that the ‘right to exclude’ is the essence of a true property right.”); Thomas W. Merrill, Property
and the Right to Exclude, 77 NEB. L. REV. 730, 730 (1998) (“[T]he right to exclude others is more
than just ‘one of the most essential’ constituents of property—it is the sine qua non.”).
59.
Bloomer v. McQuewan, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 539, 549 (1852); see also Herbert F. Schwartz,
Note, Injunctive Relief in Patent Infringement Suits, 112 U. PA. L. REV. 1025, 1041–42 (1964) (“By the
middle of the nineteenth century, courts generally recognized that the plaintiff was entitled to . . . an
injunction against future infringements for the life of the patent.” (footnotes omitted)).
60.
Cont’l Paper Bag Co. v. E. Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405, 429 (1908).
61.
Id. at 407, 427–28. According to the trial court, Eastern’s purpose in purchasing the
patent-in-suit was to “lock[ ] up” the technology and thus prevent competitors from using it for
the rest of the patent’s life. See E. Paper Bag Co. v. Cont’l Paper Bag Co., 142 F. 479, 487 (C.C.D.
Me. 1905) (“[Eastern] has never attempted to make any practical use of [the patent], either itself
or through licenses, and apparently its proposed policy has been to avoid this.”).
62.
Cont’l Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. at 416.
63.
Id. at 407. The court also ordered an accounting of Continental’s profits derived from
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On appeal, Continental argued the trial court erred in granting an
injunction because Eastern had unreasonably failed to use the patented
invention.64 Continental’s argument was primarily based on the policy claim
that Eastern’s non-use did not promote the constitutional purpose of the
patent system “to promote the progress of science and useful arts.”65 The
Court rejected this claim, holding that “patents are property” and thus are
“entitled to the same rights and sanctions as other property.”66 Because a
patent is the “absolute property” of its owner, the Court reasoned, Eastern was
entitled to “insist upon all the advantages and benefits which [patent law]
promises,” including injunctive relief, despite its non-use.67 It concluded by
explaining that the patent “right can only retain its attribute of exclusiveness
by a prevention of its violation. Anything but prevention takes away the
privilege which the law confers upon the patentee.”68
After its creation by Congress in 1982, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit—which hears all appeals of patent infringement claims69—
continued to treat patents as conferring a strong property right to exclude.70
For instance, it stated in one early decision that “the right to exclude
recognized in a patent is . . . the essence of the concept of property.”71
Although recognizing that “a district court has discretion whether to enter an
injunction,”72 the Federal Circuit declared “that an injunction should issue
once infringement has been established unless there is a sufficient reason for
denying it.”73 In practice, this resulted in a “general rule that courts will issue
permanent injunctions against patent infringement.”74 Only in rare instances,
such as to prevent harm to public health or welfare, did courts deny
permanent injunctions.75

the infringement. Id.
64.
Id. at 422.
65.
Id. at 422–23 (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8).
66.
Id. at 425.
67.
Id. at 424.
68.
Id. at 430.
69.
28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1) (2012).
70.
See In re Etter, 756 F.2d 852, 859 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (“The patent right is a right to exclude. . . .
The essence of all property is the right to exclude, and the patent property right is certainly not
inconsequential.”); Carl Schenck, A.G. v. Nortron Corp., 713 F.2d 782, 786 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (“The
patent right is but the right to exclude others, the very definition of ‘property.’”).
71.
Connell v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 722 F.2d 1542, 1548 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (citation
omitted); see also Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Hass Co., 448 U.S. 176, 215 (1980) (noting “the
long-settled view that the essence of a patent grant is the right to exclude”).
72.
Trans-World Mfg. Corp. v. Al Nyman & Sons, Inc., 750 F.2d 1552, 1564 (Fed. Cir. 1984)
(citation omitted).
73.
W.L. Gore & Assocs., Inc. v. Garlock, Inc. 842 F.2d 1275, 1281 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
74.
MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc. (MercExchange II), 401 F.3d 1323, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
75.
See Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 56 F.3d 1538, 1547 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (“[C]ourts have
in rare instances exercised their discretion to deny injunctive relief in order to protect the public
interest.”); City of Milwaukee v. Activated Sludge, Inc., 69 F.2d 577, 593 (7th Cir. 1934) (denying
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eBay v. MercExchange

This Subpart describes the eBay litigation, culminating with the Supreme
Court’s rejection of the “general rule” in favor of injunctive relief and its
replacement with a four-factor test. As explained in more detail below, the
application of this four-factor test represents a significant shift away from
property rules toward liability rules for the enforcement of patent rights.
1. Initial District Court Decision
MercExchange, L.L.C., a failed startup founded by the inventor of the
patent-in-suit,76 asserted that eBay, Inc., infringed U.S. Patent No. 5,845,265
(“the ‘265 patent”), which claimed a method and apparatus “for an electronic
market designed to facilitate the sale of goods between private individuals by
establishing a central authority to promote trust among participants.”77 After
a five-week trial, a jury found the ‘265 patent (and one other patent in the
same family as the ‘265 patent) was valid and infringed, and it awarded
MercExchange $35 million in damages.78
MercExchange subsequently moved for entry of a permanent injunction,
which the district court denied.79 While recognizing that “the grant of
injunctive relief against the infringer is considered the norm,” the district
court stated that it was required to consider “traditional equitable principles,”
including “(i) whether the plaintiff would face irreparable injury if the
injunction did not issue, (ii) whether the plaintiff has an adequate remedy at
law, (iii) whether granting the injunction is in the public interest, and
(iv) whether the balance of the hardships tips in the plaintiff’s favor.”80
After evaluating these factors, the district court found none of them
weighed in favor of granting an injunction. First, the district court pointed to
“evidence of the plaintiff’s willingness to license its patents, its lack of
a permanent injunction that would have required closing Milwaukee’s sewage treatment plan and
dumping untreated sewage into Lake Michigan, thus endangering “the health and the lives of
more than half a million people”). One notable example of a pre-eBay denial of a permanent
injunction occurred in Foster v. American Machine & Foundry Co., where the Second Circuit
affirmed the trial court’s denial of a permanent injunction when a patentee who did not
manufacture a product using the patented technology sought to exclude a manufacturing
infringer. Foster v. Am. Mach. & Foundry Co., 492 F.2d 1317, 1324 (2d Cir. 1974).
76.
For a detailed description of MercExchange and its founder, Thomas G. Woolston, who was
also the inventor of the ‘265 patent, see Holte, Trolls or Great Inventors, supra note 4, at 23–30.
77.
eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 390 (2006).
78.
MercExchange I, 275 F. Supp. 2d 695, 698–99 (E.D. Va. 2003). The district court struck $5.5
million from the jury’s award for eBay’s inducement of a third party to infringe the ‘265 patent,
concluding that it would result in impermissible double counting. Id. at 710. In addition, the jury’s $4.5
million verdict for infringement of another patent-in-suit (U.S. Patent No. 6,085,176) was subsequently
vacated on appeal because that patent was invalid as anticipated. MercExchange II, 401 F.3d at 1333–35
(referring to MercExchange I, 275 F. Supp. 2d at 698–99).
79.
MercExchange I, 275 F. Supp. 2d at 710–15. For a summary of the parties’ briefing on
the issue of injunctive relief at the trial court level, see Holte, Misinterpretation of eBay, supra note
4, at 691–95.
80.
MercExchange I, 275 F. Supp. 2d at 711.

A5_SEAMAN (DO NOT DELETE)

2016]

7/8/2016 9:51 AM

PERMANENT INJUNCTIONS IN PATENT LITIGATION

1963

commercial activity in practicing the patents, and its comments to the media
as to its intent with respect to enforcement of its patent rights” in concluding
that eBay had rebutted the presumption that MercExchange would suffer
irreparable harm absent an injunction.81 Second, the district court relied on
MercExchange’s practice of “licens[ing] its patents to others in the past” and
“its willingness to license the patents to the defendants in this case” as
evidence that it had an adequate remedy at law.82 Third, it held “the public
interest factor equally supports granting an injunction to protect
[MercExchange]’s patent rights, and denying an injunction to protect the
public’s interest in using a patented business-method that the patent holder
declines to practice.”83 Finally, the district court concluded the balance of
hardships favored eBay because “[a]ny harm suffered . . . by the defendants’
infringement of the patents can be recovered by way of damages.”84
2. Federal Circuit Decision
MercExchange appealed to the Federal Circuit, which affirmed the jury’s
findings that the ‘265 patent was valid and infringed by eBay in a published
decision in March 2005, but it reversed the district court’s denial of a
permanent injunction.85 The Federal Circuit first recounted “the general
rule . . . that a permanent injunction will issue once infringement and validity
have been adjudged.”86 It then concluded that the district court had failed to
“provide any persuasive reason to believe this case is sufficiently exceptional
to justify the denial of a permanent injunction.”87 In particular, the Federal
Circuit criticized the district court’s reasoning that MercExchange’s
willingness to license its patents meant that it did not suffer irreparable harm
and that it had an adequate remedy at law, stating that offers to license
“should not . . . deprive [MercExchange] of the right to an injunction to
which it would otherwise be entitled. Injunctions are not reserved for
patentees who intend to practice their patents, as opposed to those who
choose to license.”88 It also held that the district court’s “general concern
regarding business-method patents” were “not a sufficient basis for denying a
permanent injunction.”89 On the issue of damages, the Federal Circuit

81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
1989)).
87.
88.
89.

Id. at 712.
Id. at 713.
Id. at 714.
Id.
MercExchange II, 401 F.3d at 1326.
Id. at 1338 (citing Richardson v. Suzuki Motor Co., 868 F.2d 1226, 1246–47 (Fed. Cir.
Id. at 1339.
Id.
Id.

1964

IOWA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 101:1949

declined to overturn the $25 million award for past infringement of the ‘265
patent.90
3. Supreme Court Decision
On November 28, 2005, the Supreme Court granted eBay’s petition for
writ of certiorari on the issue of permanent injunctive relief.91 In particular,
the Court explicitly directed the parties to brief and argue “[w]hether this
Court should reconsider its precedents, including Continental Paper Bag Co. v.
Eastern Paper Bag Co., on when it is appropriate to grant an injunction against
a patent infringer.”92 The appeal attracted significant media attention from
the popular press,93 and numerous intellectual property scholars, bar
organizations, and high-technology firms filed amicus briefs with the Court.94
On May 16, 2006, the Court unanimously reversed the Federal Circuit.95
The Court’s opinion, delivered by Justice Thomas, is succinct—less than five
full pages in the official United States Reports. After summarizing the parties
and procedural history of the case, the Court announced that “[a]ccording to
well-established principles of equity, a plaintiff seeking a permanent
injunction must satisfy a four-factor test.”96 Specifically, it held that the
patentee must show:

90.
Id. at 1326; see also supra note 78 and accompanying text (explaining how the jury’s
verdict was reduced to $25 million).
91.
eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 546 U.S. 1029 (2005) (granting writ of certiorari).
92.
Id. (internal citation omitted).
93.
See, e.g., Katie Hafner, Justices Will Hear Patent Case Against eBay, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 27, 2006),
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/03/27/technology/27ebay.html (noting that the eBay appeal “has
attracted an unusual amount of public attention in part because of recent attempts by large
corporations to change patent law to lessen the threat posed by so-called nonpracticing patent
holders”); see also Joan Biskupic, Supreme Court Hears eBay Patent Case, USA TODAY, (Mar. 29, 2006, 9:47
PM), http://www.usatoday30.usatoday.com/tech/news/2006-03-29-ebay-case_X.htm.
94.
See, e.g., Brief Amici Curiae of 52 Intellectual Property Professors in Support of
Petitioners, eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006) (No. 05-130), 2006 WL
1785363; Brief of Various Law & Economics Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of
Respondent, eBay, 547 U.S. 388 (No. 05-130), 2006 WL 639164; Brief of the American Bar Ass’n
as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent, eBay, 547 U.S. 388 (No. 05-130), 2006 WL 639167;
Brief of American Intellectual Property Law Ass’n & Federal Circuit Bar Ass’n as Amici Curiae in
Support of Neither Party, eBay, 547 U.S. 388 (No. 05-130), 2006 WL 148639; Brief of Amicus
Curiae Yahoo! Inc. in Support of Petitioner, eBay, 547 U.S. 388 (No. 05-130), 2006 WL 218988;
Brief of I.B.M. Corp. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party, eBay, 547 U.S. 388 (No. 05130), 2006 WL 235006. A summary of the amicus briefs filed in the Supreme Court is available
at Holte, Misinterpretation of eBay, supra note 4, at 691–95.
95.
eBay, 547 U.S. at 390.
96.
Id. at 391. Several remedies scholars have persuasively argued that the four-factor test
articulated in eBay was in fact not “well-established.” See DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN
REMEDIES: CASES AND MATERIALS 339 (4th ed. 2012) (concluding that “there was no ‘traditional’
four-part test” for permanent injunctions); Gergen et al., supra note 4, at 207 (explaining how
the eBay decision’s “four-factor test differs from traditional equitable practice in at least three,
and possibly four, significant ways”); Rendleman, supra note 4, at 76 n.71 (noting that
“[r]emedies specialists had never heard of the four-point test” announced in eBay).
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(1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that remedies
available at law, such as monetary damages, are inadequate to
compensate for that injury; (3) that, considering the balance of
hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity
is warranted; and (4) that the public interest would not be disserved
by a permanent injunction.97
The Court then declared that this four-part test “appl[ied] with equal force to
disputes arising under the Patent Act.”98
The Court’s opinion acknowledged that patents confer property rights
upon their owners, including “the right to exclude others from making, using,
offering for sale, or selling the invention.”99 However, it rejected the Federal
Circuit’s reasoning that this right “justifies [the] general rule in favor of
permanent injunctive relief,” asserting—without citing to any authority—that
“the creation of a right is distinct from the provision of remedies for violations
of that right.”100 Instead, it concluded that “injunctive relief ‘may’ issue only
‘in accordance with the principles of equity.’”101
The Court held that neither the district court nor the Federal Circuit had
“fairly applied . . . traditional equitable principles in deciding
[MercExchange]’s motion for a permanent injunction.”102 First, it criticized
the district court for apparently “adopt[ing] certain expansive principles
suggesting that injunctive relief could not issue in a broad swath of cases,”
including when a patent owner did not commercially practice the patented
invention or when it was willing to license the patent-in-suit to others,
declaring that these “categorical rule[s] . . . cannot be squared with the
principles of equity adopted by Congress.”103 The Court specifically cited its
decision in Continental Paper Bag to support its conclusion that the district
court could not categorically deny injunctive relief to a non-practicing patent
holder.104 At the same time, it rebuffed the Federal Circuit’s adoption of a
“general rule, unique to patent disputes, that a permanent injunction
[should] issue” absent “exceptional circumstances,” explaining that the
Federal Circuit’s departure “in the opposite direction” also was incompatible
with the four-factor test.105 The Court then vacated and remanded the case to
the district court to apply “the traditional four-factor framework.”106

97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

eBay, 547 U.S. at 391.
Id.
Id. at 392 (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2006)).
Id.
Id. (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 283 (2006)).
Id. at 393.
Id.
Id. (citing Cont’l Paper Bag Co. v. E. Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405, 422–430 (1908)).
Id. at 393–94 (quoting MercExchange II, 401 F.3d 1323, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2005)).
Id. at 394.
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This unanimous opinion, however, only thinly veiled an apparent deepseated disagreement between the Justices regarding the proper circumstances
for granting permanent injunctions in future patent cases.107 These diverging
views burst to the forefront in two concurring opinions. In a two-paragraph
concurrence, Chief Justice Roberts, joined by Justices Scalia and Ginsburg,
suggested trial courts would be wise to consider “a page of history” and
continue to grant injunctions in the “vast majority of patent cases” after
eBay.108 In particular, the Chief Justice noted the difficulty of protecting the
right to exclude “through monetary remedies that allow an infringer to use an
invention against the patentee’s wishes.”109
In a separate concurrence, Justice Kennedy, joined by Justices Stevens,
Souter, and Breyer, initially expressed agreement with the Chief Justice’s
statement that “history may be instructive in applying [the four-factor] test,”
but immediately proceeded to critique the Chief Justice’s assertion regarding
the difficulty of protecting the right to exclude without an injunction.110
Justice Kennedy’s concurrence contended that “[b]oth the terms of the
Patent Act and the traditional view of injunctive relief accept that the
existence of a right to exclude does not dictate the remedy for a violation of
that right.”111 It then asserted that modern patent cases often differed from
historical patent litigation in several important ways, including the role of
non-practicing patentees who employ injunctive relief “as a bargaining tool to
charge exorbitant fees to companies that seek to buy licenses to practice the
patent.”112 Justice Kennedy’s concurrence also explained that injunctions may
be inappropriate “[w]hen the patented invention is but a small component of
the product the companies seek to produce and the threat of an injunction is
employed simply for undue leverage in negotiations.”113 Finally, Justice
Kennedy pointed to the “burgeoning number of patents over business
methods,” some of which suffer from “potential vagueness and suspect
validity,” as another reason to potentially deny injunctive relief.114

107.
See James M. Fischer, The “Right” to Injunctive Relief for Patent Infringement, 24 SANTA
CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 1, 20 (2007) (“The Court’s decision in eBay, although
presented as a unanimous decision . . . is sufficiently terse, pithy, and fractured by the two
concurrences as to provide some support to practically any conclusion one wishes to draw from
the decision.”); Paul M. Mersino, Note, Patents, Trolls, and Personal Property: Will eBay Auction Away
a Patent Holder’s Right to Exclude?, 6 AVE MARIA L. REV. 307, 326 (2007) (“The generality in the
[C]ourt’s holding [in eBay] was compounded by the fact that, although it was technically
unanimous, the two concurring opinions were highly divergent on exactly how the holding
should be applied.”).
108.
eBay, 547 U.S. at 395 (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (citation omitted).
109.
Id.
110.
Id. at 395–96 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
111.
Id. at 396.
112.
Id.
113.
Id.
114.
Id. at 397.
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4. After Remand
An important part of the eBay litigation—although sometimes
overlooked in the shadow of the landmark Supreme Court decision—is the
decision of the district court after remand. Applying the four-factor test
mandated by the Court’s decisions, the district court again denied injunctive
relief to MercExchange.115 This opinion is instructive because the district
court’s reasoning has been widely adopted by subsequent courts when
declining to grant injunctive relief to prevailing patentees.
In a detailed written decision issued on July 27, 2007, the district court
found that three of the four eBay factors weighed against an injunction.116
First, it concluded MercExchange could not demonstrate irreparable harm.
The district court explained that the traditional presumption of irreparable
harm following a finding of infringement did not survive the Supreme Court’s
decision, which “require[d] the [patentee] to demonstrate that it has suffered
an irreparable injury.”117 MercExchange could not demonstrate such harm,
the court reasoned, because it had “acted inconsistently with defending its
right to exclude” by “follow[ing] a consistent course of licensing its patents to
market participants.”118 In particular, MercExchange’s “consistent course of
litigating or threatening litigation to obtain money damages . . . indicates that
MercExchange has utilized its patents as a sword to extract money rather than
as a shield to protect its right to exclude.”119 Thus, it concluded
MercExchange’s patent licensing practice “plainly weighs against a finding of
irreparable harm.”120 For similar reasons, the district court found
MercExchange had an adequate remedy at law because it had demonstrated
a “consistent desire to obtain royalties in exchange for a license to its
intellectual property” and thus could be made whole through monetary
damages.121
Third, the court found that the “balance of the hardships” factor favored
neither party due to a variety of uncertainties, including eBay’s claimed design
around, the possibility that the ‘265 patent would be invalidated in
reexamination, and the potential of eBay to lose customers if it was forced to

115.
MercExchange L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc. (MercExchange III), 500 F. Supp. 2d 556, 559 (E.D.
Va. 2007).
116.
Id. at 569–91.
117.
Id. at 569 (emphasis omitted); see also id. (“[E]ven though an affirmed jury verdict
establishes that eBay is a willful infringer . . . , a permanent injunction shall only issue if plaintiff
carries its burden of establishing that, based on traditional equitable principles, the case specific
facts warrant entry of an injunction.”).
118.
Id.
119.
Id. at 572.
120.
Id. at 573. The District Court also noted that MercExchange’s failure to seek
preliminary injunctive relief and its business method patent also weighed against a finding of
irreparable harm. Id. at 574–75.
121.
Id. at 583 (emphasis omitted).
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remove the infringing buy-it-now option from its website.122 Fourth, the
district court determined that the final eBay factor, the public interest,
weighed slightly against entry of an injunction because the public interest
favored damages—a liability rule—rather than an injunction because
MercExchange was “merely seeking an injunction as a bargaining chip to
increase [its] bottom line.”123 In the court’s judgment, this outweighed “the
public . . . benefits from a strong patent system.”124
Following denial of a permanent injunction, the district court directed
entry of final judgment that the ‘265 patent was willfully infringed and valid,
and it confirmed the damages award.125 eBay then launched a second appeal
to the Federal Circuit,126 but the parties resolved their dispute in February
2008 through an out-of-court settlement in which eBay agreed to purchase
the ‘265 patent (and two other patents) for an undisclosed sum.127
B. EXISTING LITERATURE ON EBAY’S IMPACT
In the wake of the Supreme Court’s decision, scholars and others
questioned how eBay would affect the availability of injunctive relief in patent
litigation.128 The existing literature regarding eBay’s impact suggests that
while permanent injunctions are still commonly granted, certain types of
patent disputes have largely shifted from a property rule to a liability rule.
Several previous studies have found that prevailing patentees still receive
permanent injunctions approximately three-quarters of the time following
eBay. One article published in 2008 found that district courts awarded
permanent injunctions in approximately 78% of cases.129 Another study of
injunction decisions through May 2009 disclosed that permanent injunctions
122.
Id. at 583–86.
123.
Id. at 588.
124.
Id. at 587.
125.
MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc. (MercExchange IV), 660 F. Supp. 2d 653, 658–59
(E.D. Va. 2007).
126.
Notice of Appeal, MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., No. 2:01-CV-00736 (E.D. Va.
Dec. 18, 2007), ECF No. 758. eBay’s appeal was docketed as No. 2008-1139.
127.
See Press Release, eBay Inc. and MercExchange, L.L.C. Reach Settlement Agreement, EBAY
(Feb. 28, 2008), http://investor.ebayinc.com/releasedetail.cfm?releaseid=296670.
128.
See, e.g., FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 8, at 217 (noting that eBay “created significant
uncertainty concerning the circumstances under which courts would deny permanent
injunctions”); F. Scott Kieff, Removing Property from Intellectual Property and (Intended?) Pernicious
Impacts on Innovation and Competition, in COMPETITION POLICY AND PATENT LAW UNDER
UNCERTAINTY: REGULATING INNOVATION 416, 425 (Geoffrey A. Manne & Joshua D. Wright eds.,
2011) (“In the final analysis, the full impact of the eBay case remains an open question for
debate.”); Crane, supra note 31, at 264 (“In light of eBay, injunctions no longer issue as a matter
of course in infringement cases, but it remains to be seen just how wide the impact of eBay will
be.”); The Supreme Court, 2005 Term—Leading Cases, 120 HARV. L. REV. 125, 337 (2006) (asserting
that “eBay raises more questions about the grant of permanent injunctions than it answers” and
that “the opinion leaves patent holders to speculate whether fewer permanent injunctions against
infringers will issue in a post-eBay world”).
129.
See Ellis et al., supra note 4, at 441–42 nn.35–36 (finding permanent injunctions
awarded in 28 of 36 district court decisions).
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were granted 72% of the time.130 Similarly, in a 2012 article, Colleen Chien
and Mark Lemley reported that “courts have granted about 75% of requests
for injunctions, down from an estimated 95% pre-eBay.”131 A recent paper by
Kirti Gupta and Professor Jay Kesan found that permanent injunction
motions between eBay and 2012 were granted 80% of the time.132 Finally, a
database of permanent injunction decisions hosted by the University of
Houston Law Center’s Institute for Intellectual Property and Information Law
indicates permanent injunctions have been granted 75% of the time from
eBay through 2013.133
Although patentees as a whole appear to enjoy a relatively high success
rate in obtaining injunctive relief following eBay, prior commentators have
noted that patent holders who primarily engage in licensing and litigation—
commonly referred to as PAEs134—are much less successful.135 For instance,
Chien and Lemley found that through August 2011, district courts granted
injunctions to PAEs only 26% of the time—and only 7% of cases where the
injunction request was contested by the infringer.136 Similarly, a report by the
Federal Trade Commission found that “non-practicing patentees have been
less likely than practicing patentees to receive injunctions.”137 Many of these
decisions relied on the reasoning in Justice Kennedy’s concurrence

130.
Ernest Grumbles III et al., The Three Year Anniversary of eBay v. MercExchange: A
Statistical Analysis of Permanent Injunctions, INTELLECTUAL PROP. TODAY (Nov. 2009), at 25.
131.
Chien & Lemley, supra note 2, at 9–10 (footnotes omitted).
132.
Kirti Gupta & Jay P. Kesan, Studying the Impact of eBay on Injunctive Relief in Patent Cases
9 fig.3 (July 10, 2015) (unpublished manuscript), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=2629399.
133.
Post-eBay Permanent Injunction Rulings in Patent Cases to 12-31-13, PATSTATS.ORG,
http://patstats.org/Patstats2.html (last visited Mar. 11, 2016) [hereinafter PATSTATS.ORG]. After
removing apparently duplicative entries, this database reports that permanent injunctions were
granted in 174 cases and denied in 57 cases. Id. However, a review of the listed cases in this
database indicates that a number of these decisions involved cases where the entry of a permanent
injunction was unopposed by the infringer, thus skewing the overall grant rate somewhat higher.
Id; see also infra note 175 and accompanying text.
134.
See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
135.
See Chien & Lemley, supra note 2, at 2 (“In the wake of . . . eBay . . . district courts rarely
grant injunctions in patent infringement cases to patent-assertion entities . . . .”); Lily Lim &
Sarah E. Craven, Injunctions Enjoined; Remedies Restructured, 25 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH
TECH. L.J. 787, 798 (2009) (finding that “an NPE’s chance of getting an injunction [fell]
precipitously” after eBay compared to “a patentee who directly competes in the marketplace”);
Sandrik, supra note 4, at 111 (noting that “NPEs are hard-pressed to get an injunction” after
eBay); Yixin H. Tang, Note, The Future of Patent Enforcement After eBay v. MercExchange, 20 HARV.
J.L. & TECH. 235, 246 (2006) (asserting that after eBay, “patent holders who did not practice their
patents found themselves in a more difficult position”).
136.
Chien & Lemley, supra note 2, at 10 fig.1; see also id. at 11 (“Of all groups, PAEs are least
likely to obtain an injunction; they tend to succeed in their requests only when the defendant
fails to object.”).
137.
FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 8, at 256. This report found that patentees who
practiced the patent received injunctions at an 83% rate, while patentees who did not practice
the patent received an injunction at a 43% rate. Id. at 259.
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suggesting that patent holders who do not practice their patents generally
should not receive an injunction because it would give them “undue leverage”
in licensing negotiations.138
Another factor discussed in the existing literature is the relationship
between the litigants.139 When the parties-in-suit are competitors, a
permanent injunction typically issues.140 Indeed, the Federal Circuit has gone
so far as to declare that the “essential attribute of a patent grant is that it
provides a right to exclude competitors from infringing the patent.”141
According to one commentator, “[i]f the parties can fairly be described as
direct competitors, the first two factors” of the eBay test—irreparable injury
and absence of an adequate remedy at law—“will weigh heavily in favor of the
[patentee].”142 For instance, the types of competition-related harms that
courts have found sufficient to demonstrate an irreparable injury include loss
of market share, loss of goodwill among customers, and price erosion.143 In
138.
eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 396 (2006). For examples of district
court opinions citing Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in denying an injunction to a non-practicing
patentee, see Hynix Semiconductor Inc. v. Rambus Inc., 609 F. Supp. 2d 951, 966 (N.D. Cal.
2009); i4i Ltd. P’ship v. Microsoft Corp., 670 F. Supp. 2d 568, 600 (E.D. Tex. 2009);
Commonwealth Sci. and Indus. Research Organisation v. Buffalo Tech. Inc., 492 F. Supp. 2d 600,
605 (E.D. Tex. 2007); MPT, Inc. v. Marathon Labels, Inc., 505 F. Supp. 2d 401, 419–20 (N.D.
Ohio 2007); and z4 Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 434 F. Supp. 2d 437, 441 (E.D. Tex. 2006).
See also Ted Sichelman, Purging Patent Law of “Private Law” Remedies, 92 TEX. L. REV. 517, 520–22
& n.13 (2014) (discussing Justice Kennedy’s “influential concurrence”).
139.
See Chao, supra note 4, at 549 (noting that “[o]ne category of fact patterns that has
figured prominently in cases applying the eBay factors [is] the existence, or lack of direct
competition” between the litigants).
140.
See, e.g., SynQor, Inc. v. Artesyn Techs., Inc., No. 2:07-CV-497-TJW-CE, 2011 WL
238645, at *3 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 24, 2011) (“The best case for obtaining a permanent injunction
often occurs when the plaintiff and defendant are competing in the same market.”); Advanced
Cardiovascular Sys., Inc. v. Medtronic Vascular, Inc., 579 F. Supp. 2d 554, 558 (D. Del. 2008)
(“Courts awarding permanent injunctions typically do so under circumstances where plaintiff
practices its invention and is a direct market competitor.”); Beckerman-Rodau, supra note 4, at
632 (“Typically, permanent injunctions continue to issue when the patent owner and the
infringer are direct marketplace competitors.”); Chao, supra note 4, at 553 (“[T]he existence of
direct competition appears to be a good predictor of whether a permanent injunction will
issue.”); Ellis et al., supra note 4, at 442 (“To date, the relationship of the parties-in-suit has been
the single most important determinant as to whether an injunction will issue. For the most part,
when the parties-in-suit were deemed direct competitors, permanent injunctions were issued.”
(footnotes omitted)). An FTC study found that injunctions were granted 87% of the time when
the patentee and the defendant competed. FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 8, at 259.
141.
Acumed LLC v. Stryker Corp., 551 F.3d 1323, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (emphasis added).
142.
Stacy Streur, The eBay Effect: Tougher Standards but Courts Return to the Prior Practice of
Granting Injunctions for Patent Infringement, 8 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 67, 71 (2009); see also
George M. Newcombe et al., Prospective Relief for Patent Infringement in a Post-eBay World, 4 N.Y.U.
J.L. & BUS. 549, 559–60 (2008) (finding “the infringer was a direct horizontal competitor” to the
patentee in 28 of 30 cases where a permanent injunction issued); Benjamin H. Diessel, Note,
Trolling for Trolls: The Pitfalls of the Emerging Market Competition Requirement for Permanent Injunctions
in Patent Cases Post-eBay, 106 MICH. L. REV. 305, 318 (2007) (“The market competition
requirement, more than merely correlating with results, appears to be dispositive in determining
whether to grant an injunction.”).
143.
Newcombe et al., supra note 142, at 560–62. The Federal Circuit itself has explained
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contrast, “district courts appear to have consistently denied permanent
injunctions in cases where . . . the infringer and patent holder were not
competitors.”144
A third consideration is whether the patentee has licensed or offered to
license the patented technology to others.145 As the district court concluded
after remand in eBay, a patentee’s licensing activity may demonstrate both lack
of irreparable harm and the existence of an adequate remedy at law.146
However, a recent report by the Federal Trade Commission found that
permanent injunctions were still granted in the majority of cases where the
patentee licensed others to practice the patent.147
Whether the patented invention is a “small component” of an infringing
product also may be relevant. Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion in eBay
suggested that situations where “the patented invention is but a small
component of the [infringing] product” may be inappropriate for injunctive
relief due to the threat of holdup.148 Existing scholarship suggests that district
courts frequently deny injunctive relief in these situations.149
that “facts relating to the nature of the competition between the parties undoubtedly are relevant
to the irreparable harm inquiry.” Robert Bosch LLC v. Pylon Mfg. Corp., 659 F.3d 1142, 1150
(Fed. Cir. 2011).
144.
Golden, Patent Trolls, supra note 4, at 2113; see also FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 8,
at 259 (finding permanent injunctions were granted only 25% of the time when patentee and
infringer did not compete).
145.
See Jay Dratler, Jr., eBay’s Practical Effect: Two Differing Visions, 2 AKRON INTELL. PROP. J.
35, 49 (2008) (“If the patent at issue already has been licensed to multiple parties on a
nonexclusive basis, at a standard royalty rate, all four equitable factors ordinarily favor denying
an injunction.” (emphasis omitted)); Ellis et al., supra note 4, at 452 (“[C]ompanies and
individuals . . . who license to un-related entities have been less successful in their requests for an
injunction.”); see also T.J. Smith & Nephew Ltd. v. Consol. Med. Equip., Inc., 821 F.2d 646, 648
(Fed. Cir. 1987) (concluding in a pre-eBay case that licensing the patent is “incompatible with
the emphasis on the right to exclude that is the basis for the presumption” of irreparable harm).
146.
See supra notes 118–21 and accompanying text (discussing the district court’s
reasoning); see also Telcordia Techs., Inc. v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 592 F. Supp. 2d 727, 748 n.10 (D.
Del. 2009) (concluding that the patentee’s “willingness to license its patents also suggests that its
injury is compensable in monetary damages, which is inconsistent with the right to exclude”);
Sundance, Inc. v. DeMonte Fabricating Ltd., No. 02–73543, 2007 WL 37742, at *2 (E.D. Mich.
Jan. 4, 2007) (concluding that the patentee’s “licens[ing] the [patent-in-suit] to others, and
offer[ing] to license it to [the defendant] prior to filing suit . . . demonstrate[es] that money
damages are adequate”); Andrei Iancu & W. Joss Nichols, Balancing the Four Factors in Permanent
Injunction Decisions: A Review of Post-eBay Case Law, 89 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 395, 398
(2007) (noting “the predilection some courts have to deny an injunction upon a showing of a
willingness to license”).
147.
FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 8, at 259; see also id. at 264 (“District courts have also
granted injunctions to organizations that often seek to license their patents non-exclusively.”).
148.
eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 396 (2006) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
149.
See Benjamin Petersen, Note, Injunctive Relief in the Post-eBay World, 23 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 193, 198 (2008) (“[I]n five of the ten cases where courts denied an injunction, the court
found that the patented invention is merely a small component of the infringing product. There
were no instances where a court awarded an injunction after determining that the patent covers
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One additional factor that has been mentioned as potentially favoring
entry of an injunction is a finding of willful infringement. Willful misconduct
is traditionally considered in determining the availability of equitable relief.150
For example, after remand in eBay, the district court concluded that eBay’s
“status as a willful infringer . . . plainly favors [the patentee] when conducting
an equitable balancing” in the injunction analysis.151 However, other district
courts have denied injunctions against willful infringers,152 and scholarship
published shortly after eBay concluded that “willful infringement does not
appear to be a significant factor in predicting or explaining judicial decisions
that grant or deny permanent injunctions.”153
While valuable, the existing scholarship on eBay’s impact is limited in
several important respects. First, many of the studies rely on a relatively small
number of decisions—usually several dozen cases—issued within a few years
of the Supreme Court’s decision.154 This small size makes it difficult to
only a small component of the infringing product.”); cf. Bernard Chao, Causation and Harm in a
Multicomponent World, 164 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 61, 76 (2016) (arguing that courts should not
grant injunctions in patent cases involving infringing features for multicomponent devices if it
will cause holdup).
150.
See Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Auto. Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806, 815 (1945)
(“Any willful act concerning the cause of action which rightfully can be said to transgress
equitable standards of conduct is sufficient cause for the invocation of the maxim by the
chancellor.”); see also Beckerman-Rodau, supra note 4, at 656 (noting that “[w]illful infringement,
arguably, should be relevant when the remedy being sought, such as permanent injunctive relief,
is equitable in nature”); Diessel, supra note 142, at 317 (explaining that “historically willfulness
has weighed heavily on the decision to grant an injunction”); William R. Everding, Comment,
“Heads-I-Win, Tails-You-Lose”: The Predicament Legitimate Small Entities Face Post eBay and the Essential
Role of Willful Infringement in the Four-Factor Permanent Injunction Analysis, 41 J. MARSHALL L. REV.
189, 211–17 (2007) (contending that willful infringement is relevant in several factors of the
eBay test).
151.
MercExchange III, 500 F. Supp. 2d 556, 590 (E.D. Va. 2007) (emphasis omitted); see also
Wald v. Mudhopper Oilfield Servs., Inc., No. CIV-04-1693-C, 2006 WL 2128851, at *5 (W.D.
Okla. July 27, 2006) (explaining that “the Court is unpersuaded that there is no need for an
injunction” in light of, inter alia, “the finding of willful infringement”).
152.
See, e.g., Fractus, S.A., v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 876 F. Supp. 2d 802, 828–30, 852–54 (E.D.
Tex. 2012); Creative Internet Advert. Corp. v. Yahoo! Inc., 674 F. Supp. 2d 847, 849–52 (E.D.
Tex. 2009); Voda v. Cordis Corp., No. CIV–03–1512–L, 2006 WL 2570614, at *1, *5–6 (W.D.
Okla. Sept. 5, 2006), aff’d, 536 F.3d 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2008); z4 Techs., Inc., v. Microsoft Corp.,
434 F. Supp. 2d 437, 438–44 (E.D. Tex. 2006).
153.
Beckerman-Rodau, supra note 4, at 656; see also Diessel, supra note 142, at 312–17
(analyzing the first twenty-five district court cases applying eBay and concluding “[w]hether
infringement was willful d[id] not bear on whether a plaintiff obtain[ed] an injunction”);
Sandrik, supra note 4, at 111 (“Another area of tension within the structure of patent remedies
is in cases where a willful infringer is permitted to continue engaging in behavior that was deemed
punish-worthy.”).
154.
See FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 8, at 257 (surveying 49 district court injunction
decisions from eBay through December 2008); Ellis et al., supra note 4, at 441–42 & nn.35–36
(studying 36 district court decisions issued from eBay through early 2008); Grumbles III et al.,
supra note 130, at 26 (reviewing 67 district court cases issued since the eBay decision); Newcombe
et al., supra note 142, at 557–59 & n.57, n.59 (evaluating 38 district court decisions from eBay
through February 2008); Petersen, supra note 148, at 196 (studying 33 district court decisions
applying eBay through February 2008). The exceptions are Chien & Lemley, supra note 2, at
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conduct rigorous empirical analysis due to the lack of statistical power.155
Second, several of these studies appear to be limited to district court decisions
that are reported in the Federal Supplement or commercial electronic databases
like LexisNexis and Westlaw,156 which may not be representative of all
injunction decisions.157 Third, most studies report only a few data points for
each decision, such as the ultimate outcome on injunctive relief, the identity
of the patent owner, and whether the litigants were competitors.158 This
introduces the possibility of omitted variable bias by failing to include one or
more potentially important factors in assessing the district court’s reasoning
for why an injunction was granted or denied.159 Finally, the existing literature
does not study the characteristics of the patents at issue in these decisions—
such as the number of claims in each patent, the number of citations to prior
art, and the technological field of the patented invention—to determine
whether they are related to the grant or denial of injunctive relief.160

9–10 & n.46 (analyzing 192 decisions from July 2006 through August 2011); Gupta & Kesan,
supra note 132, at 6 tbl.1 (tallying 514 permanent injunction motions after eBay); and
PATSTATS.ORG, supra note 133 (collecting 231 district court decisions from eBay through
December 2013).
155.
See THE SAGE GLOSSARY OF THE SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES 489 (Larry E.
Sullivan ed. 2009) (explaining statistical power as “the probability of correctly rejecting a false
null hypothesis”).
156.
See Ellis et al., supra note 4, at 441–42 nn.35–36 (relying on decisions reported in the Federal
Supplement and LexisNexis); Newcombe et al., supra note 142, at 557–59 & n.57, n.59 (same).
157.
See Michael Heise, The Past, Present, and Future of Empirical Legal Scholarship: Judicial
Decision Making and the New Empiricism, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 819, 843–44 (“Many [empirical legal]
studies are confined to a universe of written and published decisions. The focus on such
decisions . . . reduces the generalizability of the findings.”); David A. Hoffman et al., Docketology,
District Courts, and Doctrine, 85 WASH U. L. REV. 681, 686 (2007) (noting that published “opinions
might be unrepresentative of how trial courts resolve legal problems”); see also Hillel Y. Levin,
Making the Law: Unpublication in the District Courts, 53 VILL. L. REV. 973, 982 (2008) (“If we accept
that the law is what judges do, then we cannot evaluate the legal system by reference to only
published decisions because they may not reflect what goes on in the majority of cases.” (emphasis
omitted)).
158.
See Chien & Lemley, supra note 2, at 9–11 & 10 fig.1 (reporting permanent injunction
grant rates by entity type—university, individual practicing company, and patent assertion entity);
Grumbles III et al., supra note 130, at 27–29 (reporting injunction decision, case name, date of
decision, district court, and whether the patentee and infringer were competitors); Gupta &
Kesan, supra note 132, at 7 fig.1 (reporting preliminary and permanent injunction motion and
grant rates by year); PATSTATS.ORG, supra note 133 (reporting permanent injunction decision,
names of plaintiff and defendant, district court, date of decision, and judge).
159.
See OXFORD DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS (John Black et al. eds., 4th ed. 2012) (defining
omitted variable bias as “[a] bias . . . of a coefficient in a linear regression caused by the omission
of a relevant variable from the regression, when this variable is correlated with one or more of
the variables included in the regression”).
160.
See John R. Allison, Mark A. Lemley, Kimberly A. Moore & R. Derek Trunkey, Valuable
Patents, 92 GEO. L.J. 435, 438 (2004) (studying these and other patent characteristics and
concluding “that valuable patents differ in substantial ways from ordinary patents”); Colleen V.
Chien, Predicting Patent Litigation, 90 TEX. L. REV. 283, 287 (2011) (finding that “patents that do
end up in litigation differ markedly from patents that do not”).
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IV. METHODOLOGY
This Part first describes the research questions addressed through an
empirical study of district court decisions on permanent injunctions following
eBay. It then explains the study design and collection process for the data and
findings reported in this Article.161 Finally, it describes some limitations of the
datasets.162
A. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
This study seeks to evaluate how district courts have applied eBay’s fourfactor test for permanent injunctions in patent cases. In particular, it attempts
to determine how often injunctions are granted to prevailing patentees
following eBay, both in general and for particular types of patentees such as
PAEs. It also focuses on several considerations related to injunctive relief
mentioned in Justice Kennedy’s concurrence, such as the patentee’s
willingness to license the patent(s)-in-suit and the assertion of a “business
method” patent.163 Furthermore, it seeks to determine whether injunction
grant rates vary based on several other factors, such as the field of technology,
the district court deciding the injunction request, and whether the infringer
acted willfully. In addition, this study seeks to determine if infringed patents’
characteristics correlate to district courts’ decisions on injunctive relief.
Previous empirical studies have found patents’ characteristics to be useful in
predicting their value and whether they will likely be the subject of an
infringement lawsuit.164
Empirical studies like this one use observations of data and statistical
analysis to evaluate causal inference—that is, “whether one factor or set of
factors leads to (or causes) some outcome.”165 Empirical analysis can “allow[]

161.
See Susan D. Franck, Empiricism and International Law: Insights for Investment Treaty Dispute
Resolution, 48 VA. J. INT’L L. 767, 786–88 (2008) (explaining the importance of transparency
regarding methodology, data collection, and analysis in empirical legal research). The data
collected in this study will be made publicly available upon this Article’s publication.
162.
See infra Part IV.C.
163.
eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 396–97 (2006).
164.
See, e.g., Allison et al., supra note 160, at 448–60 (finding certain patent characteristics
correlated with assertion in litigation and thus patent value); Chien, supra note 160, at 297–326
(finding that litigated characteristics have different intrinsic and acquired characteristics than
non-litigated patents); Dietmar Harhoff et al., Citations, Family Size, Opposition and the Value of
Patent Rights, 32 RES. POL’Y 1343, 1344–45 (2003) (finding that various patent characteristics are
correlated with patent value); Jean O. Lanjouw & Mark Schankerman, Characteristics of Patent
Litigation: A Window on Competition, 32 RAND J. ECON. 129, 129 (2001) (“[T]he frequency of legal
disputes is strongly correlated with a variety of characteristics of innovations and their
owners . . . .”); Kimberly A. Moore, Worthless Patents, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1521, 1551 (2005)
(“The fact that certain patent characteristics do predict . . . likelihood of patent litigation suggests
that they are useful predictors of value.”).
165.
Lee Epstein & Gary King, The Rules of Inference, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 34–35 (2002); see
also Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Litigation Realities, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 119, 125
(2002) (“Empirical methods are those that employ means for the systematic observation of
experience in pursuit of inductive ends.”).
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scholars to verify or refute . . . claims about case law,”166 such as “the impact
of a new precedent,”167 thus helping “identify[] previously unnoticed patterns
that warrant deeper study.”168 This study engages in the technique of “content
analysis,” in which the investigator identifies relevant court decisions,
systematically reads and codes these decisions for information about the
issue(s) being studied, and then analyzes the resulting data.169 Numerous
prior studies in the field of patent law have utilized a similar methodology.170
B. STUDY DESIGN AND DATA COLLECTION
Two original datasets were created for this study. For the first dataset (the
“Decisions Dataset”), the author sought to identify all contested permanent
injunction decisions by federal district courts in patent infringement cases
from the date of the Supreme Court’s decision in eBay (May 13, 2006)
through December 2013. This represents over 7.5 years of court decisions on
injunctive relief.
Several sources were utilized to create a comprehensive list of these
injunction decisions. First, the author started with a spreadsheet of injunction
rulings compiled by Patstats.org from eBay through May 2013.171 The author
also searched the Lex Machina database of intellectual property litigation172
and the permanent injunction decisions listed in the Federal Trade
Commission’s 2011 report on patent notice and remedies173 to identify

166.
Mark A. Hall & Ronald F. Wright, Systematic Content Analysis of Judicial Opinions, 96
CALIF. L. REV. 63, 77 (2008).
167.
Id. at 91.
168.
Id. at 87.
169.
See id. at 67–76 (describing the methodology of content analysis in the context of legal
studies).
170.
See generally John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Empirical Evidence on the Validity of Litigated
Patents, 26 AIPLA Q.J. 185 (1998); John R. Allison, Mark A. Lemley & David L. Schwartz, Understanding
the Realities of Modern Patent Litigation, 92 TEX. L. REV. 1769 (2014); Kimberly A. Moore, Markman Eight
Years Later: Is Claim Construction More Predictable?, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 231 (2005); Lee
Petherbridge, Jason Rantanen & Ali Mojibi, The Federal Circuit and Inequitable Conduct: An Empirical
Assessment, 84 S. CAL. L. REV. 1293 (2011); Lee Petherbridge & R. Polk Wagner, The Federal Circuit and
Patentability: An Empirical Assessment of the Law of Obviousness, 85 TEX. L. REV. 2051 (2007); Jason
Rantanen, The Federal Circuit’s New Obviousness Jurisprudence: An Empirical Study, 16 STAN. TECH. L. REV.
709 (2013); Christopher B. Seaman, Willful Patent Infringement and Enhanced Damages After In re Seagate:
An Empirical Study, 97 IOWA L. REV. 417 (2012).
171.
Post-eBay Permanent Injunction Rulings in Patent Cases, PATSTATS.ORG,
http://patstats.org/Injunction_rulings_post-eBay_to_5-26-2013.xls (last visited Mar. 11, 2016)
(hereinafter Post-eBay Permanent Injunction Rulings). This document was updated to include
injunction rulings up to Dec. 31, 2013. See id.
172.
LEX MACHINA, https://lexmachina.com (last visited Mar. 11, 2016). The following
steps were taken to search Lex Machina: (1) selected “Documents” tab; (2) entered the following
text in the search bar: “permanent injunction” OR eBay; (3) selected “Order re: Injunction” in
“Document Tags”; (4) selected “Patent” in “Case Types”; and (5) reviewed entries for contested
injunction decisions issued between May 15, 2006 and December 31, 2013.
173.
See FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 8, at 272–78. Five cases listed in the FTC’s report
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additional relevant decisions. Injunctions that were uncontested, such as
those following entry of a default judgment or where the infringer consented
to a permanent injunction, were excluded from the dataset.174 Decisions
involving preliminary (rather than permanent) injunctions were also
omitted,175 as were cases involving design patents.176 In total, 218 district court
decisions on permanent injunctive relief were identified and included in the
Decisions Dataset.177 A list of these decisions is included in Appendix A.
Each injunction decision then was hand coded178 for a variety of
information using standardized coding instructions.179 Coded information
were excluded for not satisfying the criteria for this study: Zen Designs Grp., Ltd. v. Clint, No. 08CV-14309, 2009 WL 4050247 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 23, 2009) (default judgment entered against
accused infringer); Acticon Techs. v. Heisei Elecs. Co., No. 06-CV-4316 (KMK), 2008 WL 356872
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 5, 2008) (default judgment entered against accused infringer); Nichia Corp. v.
Seoul Semiconductor, Ltd., No. 06–0162 MMC, 2008 WL 346416 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 7, 2008)
(design patents); U.S. Philips Corp. v. KXD Tech., Inc., No. CV 05-8953 ER (PLAx), 2007 WL
4984150 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 7, 2007) (default judgment entered against accused infringer); and
Telequip Corp. v. Change Exch., No. 5:01-CV-1748 (FJS/GJD), 2006 WL 2385425 (N.D. N.Y.
Aug. 15, 2006) (default judgment entered against accused infringer).
174.
Uncontested injunction decisions were excluded for two reasons. First, counting these
injunctions would likely have skewed the grant rate higher. Second, because uncontested
injunctions are typically granted with little or no discussion by the district court, they provide
little illumination regarding why an injunction was granted.
175.
Preliminary injunction decisions in patent cases apply a distinct four-part test because
of the motion’s procedural posture—namely, the accused infringer’s liability has not yet been
determined, so the patentee’s likelihood of success must be considered as part of the court’s
analysis. See Trebro Mfg., Inc. v. Firefly Equip., LLC, 748 F.3d 1159, 1165 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“A
plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must establish that he is likely to succeed on the merits,
that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance
of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.” (quoting Winter v.
Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008))). In addition, grants of preliminary
injunctions appear to be significantly less frequent than permanent injunctions. See Chien &
Lemley, supra note 2, at 2 (noting that patentees can obtain a preliminary injunction only
“rarely”). But cf. M. A. Cunningham, Preliminary Injunctive Relief in Patent Litigation, 35 IDEA J.L.
& Tech. 213, 231 (1995) (finding that district courts granted preliminary injunctions in slightly
over 61% of the time in district court cases between 1982 and 1993).
176.
See 35 U.S.C. §§ 171–173 (2012) (statutory provisions governing design patents).
177.
Two cases were counted as each having two separate decisions on permanent injunctive
relief: Apple, Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 869 F. Supp. 2d 901 (N.D. Ill. 2012) (district court denying
permanent injunctions for both Motorola and Apple); and O2 Micro Int’l Ltd. v. Beyond
Innovation Tech. Co., No. 2-04-CV-32 (TJW), 2007 WL 869576 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 21, 2007)
(denying permanent injunction), vacated, 521 F. 3d 1351, remanded to No. 2:04-CV-00032-CE,
2010 WL 8753254 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 27, 2010) (denying permanent injunction again after
remand from the Federal Circuit).
178.
Several student research assistants conducted an initial draft of the coding. The author
then personally reviewed the coding decisions for each case and made a final decision for all
variables. The coding process took several hundred hours of time in the aggregate. See Allison et
al., supra note 170, at 1773–74 (explaining that “[c]oding of outcomes, especially in patent cases,
is notoriously difficult and time consuming”); see also Heise, supra note 157, at 829
(“Unfortunately, data gathering is frequently labor-intensive and time-consuming and,
consequently, often quite expensive.” (footnote omitted)).
179.
In empirical research, written coding instructions are preferred so that all coders apply
the same criteria for each coding decision. This helps promote consistency in coding and serves
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included the names of the litigants,180 the district court that decided the
injunction request,181 whether the injunction was granted or denied,182 and
other basic information about the case and injunction decision.183 The patent
owner in each case was classified into one of eight different types of entities.184
The technological field of the asserted patent(s),185 whether the patent(s)-insuit claimed a business method,186 and whether the case involved a claim of
infringement by a pharmaceutical manufacturer under the Hatch–Waxman
Act187 were also captured. The district court’s conclusions on each of the four
as “a check against looking, consciously or not, for confirmation of predetermined positions.”
Hall & Wright, supra note 166, at 81; see also Lee Epstein & Andrew Martin, Coding Variables, in 1
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SOCIAL MEASUREMENT 321, 325 (Kimberly Kempf-Leonard ed., 2005)
(explaining that “the overriding goal of a codebook is to minimize human judgment—to leave
as little as possible to interpretation”). In addition, written coding instructions are desirable
“because the scientific standard of replicability requires a written record of how categories were
defined and applied.” Hall & Wright, supra note 166, at 109. A copy of the author’s written coding
instructions are available upon request.
180.
Variable names are listed in capital letters and brackets in the following footnotes.
String variables were used for the name of the plaintiff [PLAINTIFF] and the defendant
[DEFENDANT] in the case. If multiple plaintiffs or defendants existed, only the first-named party
was used. The type of the patent owner—for instance, whether it was a PAE—was also classified
as a separate variable, as explained in more detail below. See infra note 184.
181.
The district court was initially recorded as a string variable [DISTRICT] using a threeor four-letter abbreviation consistent with PACER Case Locator. See U.S. Courts, Individual Court
Sites, PACER, https://www.pacer.gov/psco/cgi-bin/links.pl (last visited Mar. 11, 2016). This
string variable was then encoded into a separate, categorical (numeric) variable [DISTRICT_N]
for use in statistical analysis.
182.
This was coded as a binary variable [INJUNCTION] indicating whether a permanent
injunction was granted for at least one claim of the patent(s)-in-suit.
183. These variables included the docket number for the case [DOCKET], a citation to the
injunction decision in Westlaw or PACER [CITE], and the date of the injunction decision [DATE].
184.
Each patent holder for this variable [PATENTEE] was coded into one of the following
categories: “(1) University; (2) Individual Inventor; (3) Large Patent Aggregator; (4) Failed
Operating or Start-up Company; (5) Patent Holding Company; (6) Operating Company; (7) IP
Holding Company Owned by Operating Company; and (8) Technology Development
Company.” These classifications were adopted from a recent empirical study by several patent
scholars on the types of patent holders in patent litigation. See Christopher A. Cotropia, Jay P.
Kesan, and David L. Schwartz, Unpacking Patent Assertion Entities (PAEs), 99 MINN. L. REV. 649,
667–70 (2014) (defining each category). The author used information from the complaints and
other publicly available sources, such as the patentee’s website, to make classification decisions
for this variable. Id. at 667–68.
185.
This variable [TECH] was broken down into 9 different technological categories:
(1) Computer Software; (2) Electronics; (3) Electrical; (4) Mechanical, (5) Chemical;
(6) Biotechnology, (7) Drugs; (8) Medical Devices, and (9) Other. These categories were
modified from John R. Allison, Mark A. Lemley & Joshua Walker, Extreme Value or Trolls on Top?
The Characteristics of the Most-Litigated Patents, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 6–8 (2009).
186.
This was coded as a binary variable [BUSMETHOD].
187.
This was coded as a binary variable [ANDA]. See Drug Price Competition and Patent Term
Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)
(1984) and 35 U.S.C. § 271(e) (1984)) (commonly known as the Hatch–Waxman Act). For an
overview of patent litigation under the Hatch–Waxman Act, see FED. JUDICIAL CTR., PATENT CASE
MANAGEMENT JUDICIAL GUIDE 10-1 to 10-11 (Peter S. Menell et al. eds., 2009).
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eBay factors were coded as well.188 Finally, the Decisions Dataset included
other factors potentially related to decisions on injunctive relief, such as
whether the litigants were found to be competitors,189 whether the patent
holder had licensed or offered to license the patent(s)-in-suit to others,190
whether the district court found that the patented invention was a “small
component” of the accused product,191 and whether the infringer willfully
infringed the patent(s)-in-suit.192
A second dataset consisting of the patents-in-suit at issue in these
injunctions decisions (the “Patents Dataset”) was also created to help
determine if these patents’ characteristics were correlated with the outcomes
of these injunction decisions.193 The Patents Dataset includes 392 separate
U.S. patents.194 In addition to the outcome on injunctive relief for each
patent, several variables regarding each patent-in-suit were hand coded. These
variables include the total number of claims in the patent,195 the number of
prior art references cited by the patent,196 the number of predecessor
(parent) applications for the issued patent,197 whether the original patentee
was a small entity,198 and the number of years between the patent’s issuance
and the injunction decision.199 The National Bureau of Economic Research

188.
These were coded as binary variables: (1) irreparable harm [FACTOR1];
(2) inadequate remedy at law [FACTOR2]; (3) balance of hardships [FACTOR3]; and (4) the
public interest would not be disserved by an injunction [FACTOR4].
189.
This was coded as a binary variable [COMPETE]. Parties were classified as competitors
if they competed in a product market at any time during the patent term. Licensing of the patent
alone was considered insufficient to demonstrate competition. In addition, litigation involving
generic pharmaceutical manufacturers who indicated an intent to compete with an original
(brand name) drug manufacturer by filing an Amended New Drug Application (“ANDA”) under
the Hatch–Waxman Act were classified as competitors.
190.
This was coded as a binary variable [LICENSE]. Exclusive licenses by the patent owner
to a co-plaintiff were excluded.
191.
This was coded as a binary variable [COMPONENT].
192.
This was coded as a binary variable [WILLFUL].
193.
See supra notes 160, 164 and accompanying text.
194.
Four patents are included in the dataset twice (for a total of 396 entries) because they
were either the subject of multiple patent lawsuits that resulted in a contested injunction decision
or because they were the subject of more than one decision on injunctive relief in the same case.
These patents are: U.S. Patent No. 5,790,512; U.S. Patent No. 5,972,401; U.S. Patent No.
6,259,615; and U.S. Patent No. 6,396,722.
195.
This was coded as a numeric variable [CLAIMS].
196.
This was coded as a numeric variable [PRIORART].
197.
This was coded as a numeric variable [PARENT]. “Parent” applications included
continuation and continuation-in-part applications. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 120, 361–376 (2012); see id.
§ 121 (PCT applications). It excluded other foreign patent application filings, provisional patent
applications, and reissue/reexamination applications.
198.
This was coded as a binary variable [SMALL]. A small entity is defined as an individual,
small business concern, or nonprofit organization (including a university) who meet certain
criteria. 37 C.F.R. § 1.27(a) (2010). Small entities are entitled to a 50% reduction in patent fees.
35 U.S.C. § 41(h) (2012); 37 C.F.R. § 1.27(b) (2010).
199.
This was coded as a numeric variable [ISSUE2INJUNCTION].
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(“NBER”) technology classification for each patent was included as well.200
Finally, the number of subsequent citations by later-issued U.S. patents to
each patent-in-suit (i.e., forward citations), which is a common proxy for
patent value and quality,201 was coded.202
C. LIMITATIONS
Before discussing the study’s findings, it is important to note several
potential limitations of the methodology employed.203 First, patent litigation
is extremely complex and frequently involves “numerous issues raised by the
parties,” such as claim construction, infringement (direct and indirect),
various grounds for invalidity (including anticipation, obviousness, and
patentable subject matter), other defenses (such as inequitable conduct,
exhaustion, laches, and prosecution history estoppel), and remedies
(including injunctive relief and damages).204 Moreover, the underlying
technology and the parties’ strategic objectives can vary greatly as well.205 As a
result, it can be “difficult to make generalizations about patent litigation from
the study of individual cases.”206
Second, this study is based primarily on litigated court decisions, which
are subject to selection effects. “[T]he selection effect refers to the

200.
This variable [TECH] coded for NBER’s six primary technology categories:
(1) Chemical (excluding Drugs); (2) Computer and Communications; (3) Drugs and Medical;
(4) Electrical and Electronics; (5) Mechanical; and (6) Other. See Bronwyn H. Hall et al., The NBER
Patent Citations Data File: Lessons, Insights, and Methodological Tools 13, 41–42 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ.
Research, Working Paper No. 8498, 2001), http://papers.nber.org/papers/w8498.pdf.
201.
See generally Bronwyn Hall et al., Market Value and Patent Citations, 36 RAND J. ECON. 16
(2005). But see David S. Abrams et al., Patent Value and Citations: Creative Destruction or Strategic Disruption?
(Pa. Inst. for Econ. Research, Working Paper 13-065, 2013), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2351809 (questioning this assumption); Alan C. Marco, The Dynamics of Patent
Citations, 94 ECON. LETTERS 290, 294 (2007) (finding an unobserved heterogeneity in the rate of
patent citations because forward citations to a patent may beget more forward citations).
202.
The number of forward citations to a patent by later-issued U.S. patents (as of July
2014) is included in the “Referenced By” portion of each patent’s page on Google Patents. See
generally Patents, GOOGLE.COM, https://www.google.com/?tbm=pts&gws_rd=ssl (last visited Mar.
11, 2015) (search “Patents” in the search field). This information was then captured in two
separate numeric variables—one that included the total number of forward citations
[FWDCITE], and a second that captured the average number of forward citations per year since
the patent’s issuance [FWDCITEPERYEAR]. The latter variable was included to address the
problem of truncation due to unobserved future citation behavior.
203.
See William M. Sage, Judicial Opinions Involving Health Insurance Coverage: Trompe L’oeil or
Window on the World?, 31 IND. L. REV. 49, 61–68 (1998) (noting that “[e]mpirical studies of
judicial decisions suffer from significant limitations,” including sample size, time lag, selection
bias, and unstated rationales, but “[d]espite these limitations, the study of judicial decisions has
redeeming qualities”); David L. Schwartz, Explaining the Demise of the Doctrine of Equivalents, 26
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1157, 1187 (2011) (“All projects involving empirical studies of legal
decisions have limitations . . . .”).
204.
Schwartz, supra note 203, at 1187.
205.
Id.
206.
Id.
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proposition that the selection of tried cases is not a random sample of the
mass of underlying cases.”207 This is because “[c]ases only go to trial when the
parties substantially disagree on the predicted outcome.”208 Thus, when the
applicable legal standard clearly favors one side or the other, parties tend to
settle their disputes rather than incur the expense of litigation,209 which can
be considerable, particularly in patent litigation.210 As a result, “the disputes
selected for litigation . . . will constitute neither a random nor a representative
sample . . . of all disputes.”211
Here, the court decisions studied are not representative of all patent
disputes, or even all patent infringement litigation, because they require that
the patentee have both filed suit and then prevailed on liability (i.e.,
infringement and validity), which occurs in only about a quarter of all cases
litigated to judgment.212 The selection criteria also require that the winning
patentee seek a permanent injunction213 instead of monetary damages to
compensate for future infringement, such as an ongoing royalty.214 The
selection effect is compounded by the asymmetric stakes of injunctive relief,
which typically “harms the infringer more than it benefits the patentee.”215
These factors may result in underrepresentation of certain types of patent
cases. For instance, injunction decisions involving PAEs appear to be
underrepresented in the Decisions Dataset, as they are patentees in
approximately 12% (25 of 218 cases) of permanent injunction decisions, but
PAE litigation may represent as much as almost half of all patent cases filed.216

207.
Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Trial by Jury or Judge: Transcending Empiricism, 77
CORNELL L. REV. 1124, 1129 (1992) (alteration in original) (quoting Theodore Eisenberg, Testing the
Selection Effect: A New Theoretical Framework with Empirical Tests, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 337, 337 (1990)). For
the seminal article on the “selection effect,” see generally George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The
Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1984). But see Theodore Eisenberg, Testing the
Selection Effect: A New Theoretical Framework with Empirical Tests, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 337, 339–40 (1990)
(concluding that the refined Priest/Klein hypothesis “can be rejected as a description of all civil
litigation” but that it may accurately describe products liability litigation).
208.
Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 207, at 1129.
209.
Id.
210.
The most recent edition of the AIPLA Report of the Economic Survey reports that median
litigation costs exceed $5 million in patent infringement suits where more than $25 million is at stake.
AM. INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAW ASS’N, AIPLA 2015 REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC SURVEY 37 (2015).
211.
Priest & Klein, supra note 207, at 4.
212.
See Allison et al., supra note 170, at 1787–88 & fig.5 (finding that patentees prevailed
in only 26% of cases litigated to final judgment that were filed in 2008 and 2009).
213.
See Gupta & Kesan, supra note 132, at 8 fig.2 (finding that the filing of permanent
injunction motions in patent cases decreased from 3.3% of all cases in 2000 to 0.6% in 2012).
214.
See Paice LLC v. Toyota Motor Corp., 504 F.3d 1293, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (“Under
some circumstances, awarding an ongoing royalty for patent infringement in lieu of an injunction
may be appropriate.”). See generally Christopher B. Seaman, Ongoing Royalties in Patent Cases After
eBay: An Empirical Assessment and Proposed Framework, 23 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 203 (2015)
(reporting the results of an empirical study of ongoing royalty awards after eBay).
215.
David L. Schwartz, Pre-Markman Reversal Rates, 43 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1073, 1105 (2010).
216.
See Cotropia et al., supra note 184, at 674 fig.1 (combining percentage of cases filed by
Large Aggregators, Failed Operating Company/Start-up, Patent Holding Company, and
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Thus, selection effects may have a significant, although difficult to ascertain,
impact on the cases studied.
Third, there are several limitations inherent in content analysis. For
example, if the coding instructions are imprecise or include room for
subjectivity, this could introduce errors and negatively impact
reproducibility.217 However, this concern can be mitigated by creating, pilot
testing, and implementing clear written coding rules that all coders must
follow, as was done in this study.218 Another possible concern is that judicial
opinions may exhibit circularity. Circularity occurs when the court’s opinion
incompletely or selectively describes the relevant facts to justify its outcome.219
Thus, “the facts and reasons found in [the court’s] opinion might or might
not accurately describe the real world facts or the true nature of the judge’s
decision-making process.”220 In addition, information about the court’s
reasoning may not be publicly available—for instance, if the opinion granting
the injunction is under seal,221 or if the court’s reasoning for granting or
denying an injunction is given orally in court and a transcript of the
proceeding is inaccessible.222
Fourth, this study is limited to district court decisions; as a result, it does
not consider the outcome of any appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit or the reasoning by that court for its decision.223 Thus, if a
Technology Development Company for 2012); see also infra note 243 and accompanying text. For
instance, one recent study finds that operating companies prevail on the merits in patent
litigation almost twice as often as non-practicing entities, thus suggesting that fewer PAEs would
be in a position to seek an injunction. See John R. Allison, Mark A. Lemley & David Schwartz, How
Often Do Non-Practicing Entities Win Patent Suits? BERKELEY TECH. L.J. (forthcoming) (Stanford Law
& Econ. Olin Working Paper No. 485, at 42 tbl.6a), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2750128 (finding that operating companies won 30.6% of definitive
patent rulings in cases filed in 2008 and 2009 compared to only 14.4% of NPEs, and this
difference was statistically signficant).
217.
See Rantanen, supra note 170, at 723–24.
218.
See Hall & Wright, supra note 166, at 109–16; see also supra note 179 and accompanying
text (explaining the importance of written coding rules).
219.
Hall & Wright, supra note 166, at 95–96; see also Ann Juliano & Stewart J. Schwab, The Sweep
of Sexual Harassment Cases, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 548, 559 (2001) (“The judicial opinion is the judge’s
story justifying the judgment. The cynical legal realist might say that the facts the judge chooses to relate
are inherently selective and a biased subset of the actual facts of the case.”).
220.
Hall & Wright, supra note 166, at 95; see also Rantanen, supra note 170, at 724 (“An opinion
author might present a biased view of the facts or might not reveal his or her true reasoning.”).
221.
See, e.g., Order, O2 Micro Int’l Ltd. v. Beyond Innovation Tech. Co., No. 2-04-CV-32 (TJW)
(E.D. Tex. July 2, 2010), ECF No. 662 (sealed decision on injunctive relief). See generally Bernard Chao
& Derigan Silver, A Case Study in Patent Litigation Transparency, 2014 J. DISPUTE RESOL. 83 (2014)
(describing the problem of lack of transparency in patent litigation proceedings).
222.
See, e.g., Transcript of Hearing on Post-Trial Motions, Affinity Labs of Tex., LLC v. BMW
N.A., LLC, No. 9:08-CV-00164 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 14, 2011), ECF No. 546 (injunction hearing
transcript under seal); Transcript of Post-Trial Motion Hearing, Finisar Corp. v. DirectTV Group
Inc., No. 1:05-CV-00264 (E.D. Tex. July 6, 2006), ECF Nos. 318, 334 (transcript of court hearing
unavailable on PACER).
223.
The author is collaborating with Professor Ryan T. Holte on an empirical study of
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decision on injunctive relief is vacated or reversed on appeal, this information
is not included in the Decisions Dataset.224 Finally, this study treats permanent
injunction decisions as a binary variable (granted or denied) without
considering the timing, duration, or scope of any injunction entered.225
V. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
This Part first describes various findings from the Decisions Dataset and
the Patents Dataset, respectively.226 It then discusses some implications of
these findings.
A. DECISIONS DATASET
1. Overall Grant Rate
The overall grant rate for contested permanent injunction requests
following eBay was a principal issue investigated. As shown in Figure 1, below,
permanent injunctions were granted slightly less than three-quarters of the
time (72.5%) during the time period studied (May, 2006 to December,
2013). This figure is consistent with previous empirical scholarship on the
rate of permanent injunctions following eBay, which range between 72% and
75%.227 However, it represents a decline from the state of play before eBay,
when injunctions were granted to prevailing patentees in almost all cases.228

Federal Circuit decisions on permanent injunctive relief following eBay for the cases contained
in this dataset.
224.
See, e.g., Douglas Dynamics, LLC v. Buyers Prods. Co., 747 F. Supp. 2d 1063 (W.D. Wis. 2010)
(denying permanent injunction), rev’d and remanded to 717 F.3d 1336, 1344–46 (Fed. Cir. 2013);
Presidio Components Inc., v. Am. Tech. Ceramics Corp., 723 F. Supp. 2d 1284 (S.D. Cal. 2010)
(denying permanent injunction), vacated and remanded in relevant part to 702 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2012)
(holding the district court clearly erred in concluding that no irreparable injury existed and remanding
to district court); Robert Bosch, LLC v. Pylon Mfg. Corp., 748 F. Supp. 2d 383 (D. Del. 2010) (denying
permanent injunction), rev’d and remanded to 659 F.3d 1142 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
225.
See Golden, supra note 28, at 1405–09 (raising concerns about the scope of permanent
injunctions in patent cases).
226.
All data analysis was conducted using Stata/IC 14.0.
227.
See Chien & Lemley, supra note 2, at 9 (finding that permanent injunctions were
“granted about 75%” of the time from July 2006 to August 2011); Grumbles III et al., supra note
130, at 26 (finding that permanent injunctions were “granted approximately 72% of” the time
between May 2006 and May 2009); Gupta & Kesan, supra note 132, at 9 fig.3 (finding that
permanent injunctions were granted about 80% of the time between May 2006 and December
2012); see also PATSTATS.ORG, supra note 133 (finding that permanent injunctions were granted
75% of the time between May 2006 and May 2013).
228.
See supra notes 74–75 and accompanying text; see also Lim & Craven, supra note 135, at
798 (“Before eBay, courts granted patentees injunctions 95% of the time after finding
infringement.”).
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Figure 1. Permanent Injunction Grant Rate: May 2006 to December
2013

Figure 2 illustrates the injunction grant rate by year. Notably, injunctions
were granted over 80% of the time in the 1.5 year period following eBay
(2006–2007), but after that, injunctions were generally granted slightly less
than 70% of the time (the exception is 2009, where 77% of contested
injunction motions were granted).
Figure 2. Permanent Injunction Grant Rate by Year

In sum, the overall injunction grant rates suggest that Chief Justice
Roberts’s concurring opinion was accurate in contending that injunctive
relief would continue to be granted to prevailing patentees “in the vast
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majority of patent cases.”229 However, as described in more detail below,
injunctions are rarely granted in several types of patent disputes, suggesting
that these cases have shifted to a liability rule following eBay.
2. Grant Rate by Patented Technology
A second issue is whether the injunction grant rate varies based on the
field of patented technology. Patent litigation has long varied by industry, with
electronics, computer software, pharmaceuticals, and medical devices among
the most-litigated technologies.230 Table 1 depicts the injunction grant rate by
technological field.

Table 1. Injunction Grant Rate, by Technology
Technology
Grant Rate
N
Biotechnology

100%

4

Pharmaceuticals

92%

25

Other

87%

23

Electrical

83%

12

Chemistry

78%

9

Mechanical

75%

36

Electronics

67%

39

Medical Devices

65%

34

Software

53%

36

As illustrated above, permanent injunctions are almost always granted in
cases where the patented technology at issue involves biotechnology (100%)
or pharmaceuticals (92%).231 In contrast, injunctions were granted only
229.
eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S 388, 395 (2006) (Roberts, C.J.,
concurring).
230.
See PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS LLP, 2014 PATENT LITIGATION STUDY 12 fig.7a (2014),
http://www.pwc.com/en_US/us/forensic-services/publications/assets/2014-patent-litigationstudy.pdf (listing consumer products as 17% of all patent cases, biotechnology and pharmaceuticals as
14% of all patent cases, computer hardware and electronics at 10% of all patent cases, medical devices
as 9% of all patent cases, and software as 7% of all patent cases from 1995–2013).
231.
In the two pharmaceutical cases where an injunction was not issued, the district court found
the patent(s)-in-suit’s listing in the Orange Book and final judgment in the patentee’s favor was
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about two-thirds of the time for electronics (67%), and for medical devices
(65%). Most notably, permanent injunctions were granted only slightly over
half the time in cases involving computer software (53%)—a result that was
statistically significant.232
3. Grant Rate by District
A third issue considered was whether permanent injunction grants varied
by district. This is a salient consideration because patentees have significant
leeway under the existing venue rules to choose the forum where they wish to
litigate.233 The existing literature suggests that the forum selected can play an
important role in the ultimate outcome of the litigation.234 Table 2 depicts
the injunction grant rates for all districts with at least ten decisions during the
relevant time period, with the national average for purposes of comparison.
Table 2. Injunction Grant Rate by District (Minimum of 10 Decisions)
N
District Court
Grant Rate
District of New Jersey

92%

13

District of Massachusetts

82%

11

Central District of California

73%

11

sufficient to protect its right to exclude. See Order Denying Motion for Injunctive Relief, Valeant Int’l
v. Watson Pharms., Inc., No. 1:10-CV-20526 (S.D. Fla. July 9, 2012), ECF No. 198; Alcon, Inc. v. Teva
Pharm., USA, Inc., Civ. No. 06-234-SLR, 2010 WL 3081327 at *2–*3 (D. Del. Aug. 5, 2010).
232.
p = 0.004 using Pearson’s chi-square (χ2). This result remained statistically significant
at the p < 0.05 level after imposing a multiple testing penalty (Bonferroni adjustment) for the
nine different technology categories.
233.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) (2012) (providing that a “patent infringement [action] may be
brought in the judicial district where the defendant resides, or where the defendant has
committed acts of infringement and has a regular and established place of business”); id.
§ 1391(c)(2) (providing that for venue purposes, an entity is “deemed to reside . . . in any judicial
district in which such defendant is subject to the court’s personal jurisdiction with respect to the
civil action in question”); In re TC Heartland LLC, __ F.3d __, 2016 WL 1709433 (Fed. Cir. Apr.
29, 2016) (reaffirming that the patent venue statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1400, incorporated the
definition of corporate residence in the general venue statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)); Kimberly A.
Moore, Forum Shopping in Patent Cases: Does Geographic Choice Affect Innovation?, 79 N.C. L. REV.
889, 889–90 (2001) (“[T]he patent jurisdiction and venue statutes allow plaintiffs to bring their
patent suits in virtually any district in the country.”); see also Richard C. Wydick, Venue in Actions for Patent
Infringement, 25 STAN. L. REV. 551, 551 (1973) (“All too often, patent infringement suits begin with a
battle over where the war is to be fought.”). Pending legislation in Congress, if adopted, would
significantly limit patentees’ choice of venue. See infra note 356 and accompanying text.
234.
See Moore, supra note 233, at 917–19 & tbl.8 (finding a “significant difference in outcome
(patent holder win rate)” among the top ten patent districts); Matthew Sag, IP Litigation in U.S. District
Courts: 1994 to 2014, 101 IOWA L. REV. 1065, 1104 (2016) (explaining that “the Eastern District of
Texas and the District of Delaware have consciously adopted norms, practices, and procedures” that
make these forums “better for patent plaintiffs and worse for patent defendants”). See generally Mark A.
Lemley, Where to File Your Patent Case, 38 AIPLA Q.J. 401 (2010).
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National Average

72.5%

Eastern District of Texas

61%

36

Northern District of California

60%

10

District of Delaware

50%

26

Injunction grant rates are far from uniform, ranging from over 90% in
the District of New Jersey (92%) to a low of 50% in the District in Delaware.
Notably, two districts that are preferred forums for patent assertion entities
(PAEs)—the Eastern District of Texas and the District of Delaware235—have
injunction grant rates that fall below the national average, with the District of
Delaware’s difference from the national average being statistically
significant.236 Conversely, the District of New Jersey has a large proportion of
pharmaceutical litigation, which may help explain its high injunction grant
rate.237
4. Grant Rate by PAE Status
Fourth, this study attempted to determine whether injunction grant rates
varied based on the identity of the patentee. The past decade has seen a
significant increase in patent holders who do not manufacture products, but
instead attempt to monetize their patent portfolio through litigation and
licensing.238 These actors, commonly referred to as PAEs, have been highly
controversial; some scholars have argued that PAEs are costly and harmful to
innovation and the broader economy,239 while others contend that at least
235.
See Daniel Klerman & Greg Reilly, Forum Selling, 89 S. CAL. L. REV. 241, 268 (2016)
(“Notably, the Eastern District of Texas is especially popular with patent assertion entities . . . .”);
Yan Leychkis, Of Fire Ants and Claim Construction: An Empirical Study of the Meteoric Rise of the Eastern
District of Texas as a Preeminent Forum for Patent Litigation, 9 YALE J.L. & TECH. 193, 214 (2007)
(finding that patent trolls “have shown a clear preference for the Eastern District [of Texas] over
other venues”); Mark Liang, The Aftermath of TS Tech: The End of Forum Shopping in Patent Litigation
and Implications for Non-Practicing Entities, 19 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 29, 42–43 tbl.1 (2010)
(listing the Eastern District of Texas as the top forum for infringement suits by non-practicing
entities); Fabio E. Marino & Teri H.P. Nguyen, Has Delaware Become the “New” Eastern District of
Texas? The Unforeseen Consequences of the AIA, 30 SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J. 527, 529–30 (2014)
(“Recent survey data on new patent suit filings suggests that [non-practicing entities] have found
a new ‘forum of choice’ in the District of Delaware. . . .”).
236.
p = 0.006 using Pearson’s chi-square (χ2). This result remained statistically significant
at the p < 0.05 level after imposing a multiple testing penalty (Bonferroni adjustment) for the six
top districts being studied.
237.
See Eric H. Weisblatt & Claire Frezza, Who to Sue and Where in ANDA Litigation: Personal
Jurisdiction Post-Daimler, 69 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 351, 351 (2014) (noting that pharmaceutical
patent holders in Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA) litigation often sue in the District
of New Jersey).
238. See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 396 (2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(“An industry has developed in which firms use patents not as a basis for producing and selling goods
but, instead, primarily for obtaining licensing fees.”); Cotropia et al., supra note 184, at 649–50.
239.
See Bessen & Meurer, supra note 8, at 389 (estimating the “direct, accrued costs of NPE
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some PAEs play a valuable role by helping compensate small inventors and
companies for their innovations.240 This debate is currently playing out in
numerous arenas, most notably in Congress where legislation to curb so-called
“patent trolls” is being considered.241
This study classified each patent holder into one of eight categories based
on a classification system developed in a recent empirical study by
Christopher Cotropia, Jay Kesan, and David Schwartz regarding the role of
PAEs in the patent system.242 It then aggregated several of these categories
into a single PAE category for data analysis.243 Figure 3 shows the injunction
grant rates for PAEs compared to all other patentees.

patent assertions totaled $29 billion in 2011”); Sannu K. Shrestha, Trolls or Market-Makers? An
Empirical Analysis of Nonpracticing Entities, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 114, 129 (2010) (noting that NPEs
“may reduce social welfare” or “have an efficiency-reducing effect”).
240.
See, e.g., FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 8, at 9 (“Some argue that PAEs encourage
innovation by compensating inventors . . . .”); Peter N. Detkin, Leveling the Patent Playing Field, 6
J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 636, 636 (2007) (“Small companies and individuals have few
good options for licensing their patents or developing their inventions without interference from
infringers.”); James F. McDonough III, Comment, The Myth of the Patent Troll: An Alternative View
of the Function of Patent Dealers in an Idea Economy, 56 EMORY L.J. 189, 190 (2006) (contending that
PAEs “actually benefit society” by “act[ing] as a market intermediary in the patent market . . .
provid[ing] liquidity, market clearing, and increased efficiency to the patent markets”). But see
Robert P. Merges, The Trouble with Trolls: Innovation, Rent-Seeking, and Patent Law Reform, 24
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1583, 1588 (2009) (questioning arguments that allege that all PAEs are
beneficial to economic activity).
241.
See, e.g., Innovation Act, H.R. 9, 114th Cong. (2015); PATENT Act, S. 1137, 114th
Cong. (2015).
242.
See Cotropia et al., supra note 184, at 654, 660–71; see also supra note 184 (listing the
eight categories).
243.
This was coded as a binary variable [PAE]. The following categories from Cotropia et
al., supra note 184, were classified as PAEs for purposes of data analysis: Large Patent Aggregator;
Failed Operating or Start-Up Company; Patent Holding Company; and Technology Development
Company. Universities were excluded from the PAE category because their primary business is
the creation of knowledge and education of students, not the assertion of patents. See FED. TRADE
COMM’N, supra note 8, at 8 n.5 (“Taken literally, the term NPE encompasses patent owners that
primarily seek to develop and transfer technology, such as universities . . . . Patent assertion
entities do not include this latter group.”); see also Mark A. Lemley, Are Universities Patent Trolls?,
18 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 611, 612 (2008) (“Universities are non-practicing
entities. They share some characteristics with trolls, at least if the term is broadly defined, but
they are not trolls.”). Individual inventors were also excluded from the PAE category because at
least some individual inventors actually make and/or sell a product that practices the patented
technology or attempt to do so. See Christopher A. Cotropia, The Individual Inventor Motif in the
Age of the Patent Troll, 12 YALE J.L. & TECH. 52, 63–64 (2009) (contending that some individual
inventors “are legitimately patent trolls” but that “a significant number [are] certainly not”). Even
if both of these categories of patentees were classified as PAEs, the difference would remain highly
statistically significant (p < 0.001).
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Figure 3. Injunction Grant Rate by PAE Status

As illustrated above, PAEs rarely obtained a permanent injunction after
prevailing on liability (16%; 4 of 25 cases),244 while other patentees are
successful in obtaining injunctions in the vast majority of cases (80%; 154 of
193 cases). This difference in grant rates was highly statistically significant,
suggesting that it was not due to chance alone.245 This finding appears to lend
weight to the view expressed in Justice Kennedy’s concurrence that district
courts should be reluctant to grant injunctions when the patentee is using the
patent “not as a basis for producing and selling goods but, instead, primarily
for obtaining licensing fees.”246 It also is consistent with prior studies finding
that PAEs are rarely granted injunctions.247
Even in the rare cases where a PAE was granted an injunction, the
patentee was generally a failing or failed operating company that had
previously sought to commercialize the patent and thus was only a nonpracticing entity at the time of the injunction decision.248 For instance, in 800
244.
25 district court cases in the Decisions Dataset were found to involve PAEs. PAEs were
granted injunctions in only 4 of these 25 cases. See, e.g., i4i Ltd. P’ship v. Microsoft Corp., 670 F.
Supp. 2d 568 (E.D. Tex. 2009); 800 Adept, Inc. v. Murex Sec., Ltd., 505 F. Supp. 2d 1327 (M.D.
Fla. 2007); Commonwealth Sci. & Indus. Research Organisation v. Buffalo Tech. Inc., 492 F.
Supp. 2d 600 (E.D. Tex. 2007); Reporter’s Transcript of Hearing on Post-Trial Motions,
Anascape, Ltd. v. Microsoft Corp., No. 9:06-cv-00158 (E.D. Tex. July 18, 2008), ECF No. 395.
245.
p < 0.001 using Pearson’s chi-square (χ2).
246.
eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 396 (2006) (Kennedy, J. concurring).
247.
See Chien & Lemley, supra note 2, at 10 fig.1 (finding that PAEs were granted
injunctions in 26% of all decisions, including only 7% of cases where the injunction request was
contested by the infringer); see also Shrestha, supra note 239, at 134–35 (noting the “post-eBay
trend” that “[d]istrict courts in an increasing number of cases have refused to issue injunctions
when the patent owner did not practice the invention”).
248.
See Cotropia et al., supra note 184, at 657 (defining “Failed Operating Companies” as
firms that “either manufactured products or seriously attempted to break into the market. For
some reason, these entities failed at selling or developing products or services. They retained
their original patents, and later seek to enforce them.”).
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Adept, Inc. v. Murex Securities, the district court found that the patentee and
the defendants were “competitors in the market for telephone call routing
services,”249 although at the time of the injunction the patentee—who faced
significant financial challenges—only had a “small share of that market”250
and was simultaneously engaged in a widespread patent litigation campaign
against numerous competitors and end users (mainly former customers) of
the patented technology.251 The district court concluded that the defendants’
attempts to reduce the patentee’s market share supported a finding of
irreparable harm.252 Similarly, in Anascape, Ltd. v. Microsoft Corp., the district
court found irreparable harm and granted an injunction because although
the patentee did not presently offer a product that practiced the patented
technology (an analog stick for a video game system controller), it had been
denied what the district court called “the opportunity to go forward”—in
other words, the ability to introduce its own competing controller—due to
defendant’s infringement.253 And in i4i Limited Partnership v. Microsoft Corp.,
the district court found that Microsoft’s inclusion of the patented custom
XML technology into Microsoft Word created irreparable harm because it
“would not only directly compete with [the patentee]’s products, but render
them obsolete within the market.”254 At the time of the injunction, however,
the patentee’s primary business appeared to be patent litigation.255 These
cases suggest that a patentee who has attempted to commercialize its
invention—even if that effort was ultimately unsuccessful—has a better
chance than other PAEs of demonstrating irreparable harm, which is a critical
part of the eBay analysis.

249.
800 Adept, Inc., 505 F. Supp. 2d at 1337.
250.
Id. at 1338.
251.
For example, in 2007, 800 Adept sued nearly two dozen defendants for patent
infringement in the Eastern District of Texas. See, e.g., Complaint for Patent Infringement, 800
Adept, Inc. v. Enterprise Rent-A-Car Co., No. 5:07-CV-00057 (E.D. Tex. filed Apr. 10, 2007);
Complaint for Patent Infringement, 800 Adept, Inc. v. AT&T Mobility, LLC, No. 5:07-CV-00023
(E.D. Tex. filed Feb. 6, 2007).
252.
800 Adept, Inc., 505 F. Supp. 2d at 1337. The injunction was later vacated on appeal by the
Federal Circuit because the defendants’ services were found to not infringe under the correct claim
construction. 800 Adept, Inc. v. Murex Sec., Ltd., 539 F.3d 1354, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
253.
Reporter’s Transcript of Hearing on Post-Trial Motions, supra note 244, at 124–25.
254.
i4i Ltd. P’ship v. Microsoft Corp., 670 F. Supp. 2d 568, 599 (E.D. Tex. 2009).
255.
For example, i4i Limited Partnership’s website is almost exclusively devoted to its
litigation with Microsoft, which culminated in a $240 million award that was affirmed on appeal.
See i4i v. Microsoft, I4I, http://www.i4ilp.com (last visited Mar. 12, 2016); see also i4i Ltd. P’ship v.
Microsoft Corp., 598 F.3d 831 (Fed. Cir. 2010), aff’d, 131 S. Ct. 2238 (2011).
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5. Grant Rate and Competition Between Litigants
Whether the litigants were competitors is another relevant consideration
identified in the literature.256 This issue was studied as well. The different
grant rates for competitors and non-competitors are depicted in Figure 4.
Figure 4. Injunction Grant Rates: Competition Between Litigants

Again, there was a large disparity in injunction grant rates between these
two categories of patentees. Patent holders who competed with an infringer
were granted a permanent injunction in the overwhelming majority of cases
(84%; 150 of 179 cases), while patentees who were not market competitors
rarely succeeded in obtaining injunctive relief (21%; 8 of 39 cases).257 This
difference was statistically significant as well.258 Thus, as one district court
explained, “eBay has changed little where a prevailing plaintiff seeks an
injunction to keep an infringing competitor out of the market.”259
Medical device manufacturers represented one notable group of
competitors who were commonly denied injunctions post-eBay, as nearly a
third of medical device firms who sued a competitor were denied an
injunction (31%; 10 of 32 cases). In many of these cases, the district court
found that the patentee failed to satisfy one or both of the final two eBay
factors, balance of hardships and public interest.260 In other words, although
256.
See supra notes 139–44, 189 and accompanying text.
257.
For district court opinions in the Decisions Dataset, 179 were found to involve
competitors, while 39 cases did not involve competitors.
258.
p < 0.001 using Pearson’s chi-square (χ2). This difference remains statistically
significant if Hatch–Waxman (pharmaceutical) litigation is excluded.
259.
Amgen, Inc. v. F. Hoffman–La Roche Ltd., 581 F. Supp. 2d 160, 210 (D. Mass. 2008),
aff’d in part, vacated in part, and remanded by 580 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
260.
See, e.g., Smith & Nephew, Inc. v. Interlace Med., Inc., 955 F. Supp. 2d 69, 79–80 (D.
Mass. 2013) (holding that “the balance of hardships weighs against a permanent injunction”
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these patentees usually could demonstrate irreparable harm, the district court
nonetheless denied an injunction because removing the infringing product
from the market might adversely affect patients’ health and safety.261
In several other cases involving competitors, the district court declined
to grant an injunction because the patented technology was only a “small
component” of the infringing product, thus following the reasoning of Justice
Kennedy’s concurrence that injunctions in such cases might result in
holdup.262 And one case denied an injunction between competitors because
the patented technology was not causally connected to the alleged irreparable
harm, which has been referred to by some courts as the “causal nexus”
requirement.263
6. Irreparable Harm Findings
This study also sought to determine the basis for the district courts’
conclusion regarding irreparable harm, which is the first factor of the eBay
test. Prior to eBay, prevailing patentees were presumed to suffer irreparable

because it would cause the loss of over $250 million in investment and over 150 employees would
lose their jobs and that “the public interest weighs against granting a permanent injunction”
because “at least some doctors and their patients will suffer a negative impact if [the infringer] is
enjoined from selling its medical device”); Conceptus, Inc. v. Hologic, Inc., No. C 09-02280
WHA, 2012 WL 44064, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 9, 2012) (denying an injunction because the
infringer demonstrated “substantial hardship . . . would occur if a permanent injunction is
imposed” and “[t]he public interest would undoubtedly be harmed by an injunction” because it
“would leave only one product” on the market and thus “would have eliminated an important
alternative for patients”); Respironics, Inc. v. Invacare Corp., No. 04-0336, 2008 WL 111983, at
*6 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 8, 2008) (holding that the patentee failed to show that either “the balance of
hardships” or “the public interest” weighed in favor of granting an injunction).
261.
See, e.g., Tyco Healthcare Grp. LP v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc., 936 F. Supp. 2d 30, 86
(D. Conn. 2013) (holding that granting an injunction was contrary to the public interest because
it “would pull many devices that are presently used in surgery off the market”); Johnson &
Johnson Vision Care, Inc. v. CIBA Vision Corp., 712 F. Supp. 2d 1285, 1292 (M.D. Fla. 2010)
(concluding that “an injunction will create consequential medical, practical and economic issues”
for users’ of defendants’ product, and “[t]he deleterious effects of the injunction on the general
public would simply be too great to permit”); Bard Peripheral Vascular, Inc. v. W.L. Gore &
Assocs., Inc., No. CV-03-0597-PHX-MHM, 2009 WL 920300, at *9 (D. Ariz. Mar. 31, 2009)
(“Given . . . the important role that [the defendant’s] products play in aiding vascular surgeons
who perform life-saving medical treatments, sound public policy does not favor removing [them]
from the market.”).
262.
See Douglas Dynamics, LLC v. Buyers Prods. Co., 717 F. 3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2013);
Apple, Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 869 F. Supp. 2d 901 (N.D. Ill. 2012); Humanscale Corp. v CompX
Int’l Inc., No. 3:09-CV-86, 2010 WL 3222411 (E.D. Va. Aug. 16, 2010).
263.
See Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 909 F. Supp. 2d 1147, 1153–57 (N.D. Cal. 2012),
aff’d in part, vacated in part by 735 F.3d 1352, 1359–68 (Fed. Cir. 2013). Injunctions were also
denied in several other decisions after the time period of this study based on lack of evidence of
a “causal nexus.” See Power Integrations, Inc. v. Fairchild Semiconductor Int’l, Inc., No. C 095235 MMC, 2015 WL 604582, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 12, 2015); Riverbed Tech., Inc. v. Silver Peak
Sys., Inc., No. 11–484–RGA, 2014 WL 4695765, at *12 (D. Del. Sept. 12, 2014).
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harm,264 and this presumption was rarely rebutted.265 After the Supreme
Court’s decision, however, patentees must demonstrate irreparable harm
before an injunction can issue.266 As a result, the issue of what harm qualifies
as “irreparable” has taken on new significance since eBay.
In most cases where an injunction issued, the district court made an
explicit finding regarding the harm(s) that it found irreparable.267 Figure 5
depicts the percentage of cases where one of the following types of irreparable
harm was found: (1) loss of market share (including lost customers and lost
sales) due to infringement;268 (2) price erosion for the patentee’s product or
services that practiced the patent;269 (3) loss of goodwill or damage to the
patentee’s brand or reputation;270 (4) loss of future business opportunities;271
(5) the infringer’s potential inability to pay a monetary judgment;272 and
(6) any other type of irreparable harm that does not fall into one of the
previous five categories.273

264.
See Smith Int’l, Inc. v. Hughes Tool Co., 718 F.2d 1573, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1983)
(“[W]here validity and continuing infringement have been clearly established, as in this case,
immediate irreparable harm is presumed.” (citations omitted)).
265.
One situation where this presumption could be rebutted was when the infringing party
voluntarily terminated the allegedly infringing activities with no reasonable prospect of
resumption. See Polymer Techs., Inc. v. Bridwell, 103 F.3d 970, 974 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (affirming
the denial of injunctive relief when the accused infringer “has or will soon cease the allegedly
infringing activities”).
266.
See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
267.
Injunctions issued in 158 decisions in the dataset. Of these, 112 decisions (71%)
included an express finding regarding the type(s) of irreparable harm.
268.
This was coded as a binary variable [MKTSHARE].
269.
This was coded as a binary variable [PRICE].
270.
This was coded as a binary variable [GOODWILL].
271.
This was coded as a binary variable [FUTUREBUS].
272.
This was coded as a binary variable [INABILITY].
273.
This was coded as a binary variable [OTHER]. A narrative description of the nature of
the irreparable harm was also included [COMMENTS_HARM].
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Figure 5. Types of Irreparable Harm Found

As illustrated in the farthest left column in Figure 5, the most common
reason by far for finding irreparable harm was loss of market share (80%).
This is perhaps unsurprising in light of district courts’ willingness to grant an
injunction when the parties are competitors.274 When a competitor infringes
by introducing a new product with the patented feature, the infringer will
likely capture some of the patentee’s market share. This is especially true since
the infringer, unlike the patentee, can often charge a lower price and still
turn a profit, as it does not have to recoup the cost of developing the patented
technology.275 Similarly, price erosion (13%) and loss of future business
opportunities (19%) are competition-related harms.
Another significant source of irreparable harm was loss of goodwill or
reputation (43%) due to the infringement. This type of loss may be
irreparable because goodwill is “often difficult to quantify” and thus may be
difficult or impossible to compensate with money damages.276 A less common
basis for finding irreparable harm is the infringer’s potential inability to pay
damages (5%), which typically occurs when a sizable monetary judgment
would render the infringer insolvent.277 Finally, other types of irreparable

274.
See supra Figure 4.
275.
See, e.g., Douglas Dynamics, LLC v. Buyers Prods. Co., 717 F.3d 1336, 1344–46 (Fed.
Cir. 2013) (infringing product gained 5% market share because the infringer was “competing in
the marketplace using [plaintiff’s] patented technology” and was able to “undercut[ ] prices”).
276.
Id. at 1344; see also MicroAire Surgical Instruments, LLC v. Arthrex, Inc., 726 F. Supp.
2d 604, 635 (W.D. Va. 2010) (“The loss of goodwill is a well-recognized basis for finding
irreparable harm. . . .”).
277.
See Coloplast A/S v. Generic Med. Devices, Inc., No. C10–227BHS, 2012 WL 3262756, at *2
(W.D. Wash. Aug. 9, 2012) (finding that irreparable harm exists because, inter alia, the infringer “will
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harm due to the infringer’s conduct—such as loss of qualified employees,278
diversion of funds from research and development opportunities,279 loss of
revenue from other licensees,280 and impairment of a patent’s market
value281—were infrequently found as well (17%).
7. Other eBay Factors
This study also revealed a very strong relationship between the first and
second eBay factors—irreparable harm and absence of an adequate remedy at
law. Scholars have previously noted these two factors often collapse into a
single inquiry.282 Indeed, the district court in eBay recognized in its decision
denying injunctive relief after remand from the Supreme Court that the
adequate remedy at law factor “inevitably overlaps” with the irreparable harm
requirement.283
The data collected for this study reveal that in 136 decisions where the
district court made an express finding that irreparable harm would occur
absent an injunction (the first eBay factor), it also found in all but one of these
cases that there was no adequate remedy of law as well (the second eBay
factor).284 Similarly, in the 42 cases in the dataset where the district court
found no irreparable injury, it also found that an adequate remedy at law
existed in all but one case.285

be unable to satisfy any judgment entered against it”); Symbol Techs., Inc. v. Janam Techs., LLC, 729
F. Supp. 2d 646, 665 (D. Del. 2010) (“In some instances, a defendant’s inability to satisfy a money
judgment has been deemed sufficient to establish irreparable injury.” (citations omitted)).
278.
See Research Found. of State Univ. of N.Y. v. Mylan Pharm., Inc., Nos. 09-184-LPS, 10892-LPS, 2012 WL 1901267, at * 2 (D. Del. May 25, 2012).
279.
See ePlus, Inc. v. Lawson Software, Inc., No. 3:09CV620, 2011 WL 2119410, at * 12 (E.D.
Va. May 23, 2011).
280.
See Smith & Nephew, Inc. v. Arthrex, Inc., 629 F. Supp. 2d 1176, 1181 (D. Or. 2008).
281.
See Joyal Prods., Inc. v. Johnson Elec. N. Am., Inc., No. 04–5172 (JAP), 2009 WL
512156, at *11 (D. N.J. Feb. 27, 2009).
282.
See Gergen et al., supra note 4, at 209 (noting that eBay’s “requirements of
(1) irreparable injury and (2) inadequacy of legal remedies are redundant as these are,
traditionally speaking, one and the same”); Jeremy Mulder, Note, The Aftermath of eBay: Predicting
When District Courts Will Grant Permanent Injunctions in Patent Cases, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 67, 80
(2007) (“Courts collapse the first two factors [of the eBay test], apparently viewing irreparable
harm, if an injunction is not granted, and inadequate remedy at law, in the form of damages, as
opposite sides of the same coin.”).
283.
MercExchange III, 500 F. Supp. 2d 556, 582 (E.D. Va. 2007).
284.
The lone exception is Conceptus, Inc. v. Hologic, Inc. where the district court found
irreparable harm because the infringer took market share away from the patentee in a twosupplier market, thus causing loss of customers and potential customers, but it also found that
the patentee had an adequate remedy at law because “it will be reasonable and practical to
estimate the extent of damages.” Conceptus, Inc. v. Hologic, Inc., No. C 09-02280 WHA, 2012
WL 44064 at *2–3 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 9, 2012) (quoting ECF No. 131 at 10).
285.
See Accentra Inc. v. Staples, Inc., 851 F. Supp. 2d 1205, 1238 (C.D. Cal. 2011) (finding that
the infringer did not challenge patentee’s showing that its legal remedies are inadequate, but the
district court concluded the patentee had failed to show irreparable harm and denied an injunction).
The remaining district court decisions did not make an express finding on both eBay factors.
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In addition, in cases where the district court denied an injunction, it also
commonly found that the third and fourth eBay factors—the balance of
hardships and the public interest—weighed against injunctive relief.
Specifically, of the 60 cases in the dataset where an injunction was denied, the
district court found that the balance of hardships weighed against an
injunction half of the time (50%; 30 cases), and that the public interest
weighed against an injunction slightly over half of the time (52%; 31 cases).286
8. Regression Analysis
Finally, this study sought to evaluate the potential impact of several
additional factors on injunction decisions following eBay using multiple
regression analysis. Factors included in this analysis were whether the patent
holder licensed or offered to license the patent(s)-in-suit,287 whether the
patent(s)-in-suit claimed a business method,288 and whether the patent(s)-insuit covered a “small component” of an infringing product,289 all of which
were anticipated to be negatively correlated with an injunction. In contrast, a
finding of willful infringement was anticipated to be positively correlated with
injunctive relief.290 The previously discussed factors of patentee type (i.e., PAE
status) and competition between the litigants were anticipated to be
statistically significant as well.
Three different regression models were created to assess the impact of
these factors. The first model (Model #1) included only the factors described
above. The second model (Model #2) controlled for field of technology.291
The third model (Model #3) controlled for both field of technology and the
six district courts with the most injunction decisions.292 A statistical test called
logistic (logit) regression293 was used to assess the relationship between these
factors and the court’s ultimate decision on injunctive relief. The results in
286.
Not all decisions made an express finding on all four eBay factors. Cases where a district
court failed to expressly state that these factors weighed against an injunction or was otherwise
silent regarding them are not included in this tally.
287.
See supra notes 145–47 and accompanying text.
288.
See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
289.
See supra notes 148–49 and accompanying text.
290.
See supra notes 150–53 and accompanying text.
291. It is particularly important to control for technology when evaluating the significance of
patentee type, as PAEs commonly assert software and computer-related patents in litigation. In contrast,
PAEs rarely assert patents in the chemical and pharmaceutical fields. See Michael Risch, Patent Troll
Myths, 42 SETON HALL L. REV. 457, 477–78 (2012). Biotechnology [BIOTECH] was omitted from
Models #2 and #3 because it has a perfect predictive rate on injunction decisions (i.e., injunctions were
granted in all 4 cases in the dataset involving biotechnology patents).
292.
See supra Table 2.
293. Logistic (logit) regression is “an estimation technique . . . commonly used by legal scholars
and others to analyze judicial decisions. . . . Like other regression models, logit analyses simultaneously
measure the individual relationships between several independent variables and a single dependent
variable.” David B. Spence & Paula Murray, The Law, Economics, and Politics of Federal Preemption
Jurisprudence: A Quantitative Analysis, 87 CALIF. L. REV. 1125, 1179, 1200 (1999).
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Table 3 report the odds ratio—which is a measure of the strength of
association between the independent variable and the dependent variable
(here, whether an injunction was granted)—for each factor, with standard
errors in parentheses.294 One or more asterisks indicate statistical significance
for an independent variable.295 The pseudo-R2 value reported in the final row
(in italics) is a measure of the predictive power of the independent variables
included in each model.296
Table 3. Logistic Regression Models: Permanent Injunction Decisions
Odds Ratio
Variable297

PAE

COMPETE

LICENSE

BUSMETHOD

Model #1

Model #2

Model #3

.28

.18

.12*

(.22)

(.16)

(.12)

13.49***

18.65***

27.68***

(8.04)

(12.40)

(20.2)

1.64

1.66

2.28

(.74)

(.80)

(1.23)

.60

.36

.41

(.42)

(.31)

(.41)

294.
Odds ratios of greater than 1 indicate that the variable has a positive association with entry
of a permanent injunction, while odds ratios of less than 1 indicate the variable has a negative
relationship with entry of a permanent injunction. The amount by which the odds ratio is more or less
than 1 reveals the magnitude of the association between the independent variable and the injunction
decision. All odds ratios are reported to two decimal places. For a useful primer on odds ratios in logistic
regression, see UCLA Institute for Digital Research and Education, FAQ: How Do I Interpret Odds Ratios
in Logistic Regression?, http://www.ats.ucla.edu/stat/mult_pkg/faq/general/odds_ratio.htm (last
visited Mar. 12, 2016).
295.
For all results, * indicates p < 0.05, ** indicates p < 0.01, and *** indicates p < 0.001.
296.
Pseudo R2 values range between 0 and 1, with higher values indicating better model fit.
See UCLA Institute for Digital Research and Education, FAQ: What are Pseudo R-squareds?,
http://www.ats.ucla.edu/stat/mult_pkg/faq/general/Psuedo_RSquareds.htm (last visited Mar.
12, 2016).
297. From top to bottom in this column, the first six variables [PAE, COMPETE, LICENSE,
BUSMETHOD, COMPONENT, and WILLFUL] have been previously described. See supra notes
184, 186, 18992. The next seven variables [SOFTWARE, ELECTRONICS, ELECTRICAL,
MECHANICAL, CHEMISTRY, DRUGS, and MEDICALDEVICE] involve the field of technology
for the patent(s)-in-suit. See supra note 185. The final six variables correspond to the top six
district courts for injunction decisions: Central District of California [CDCAL]; Northern District
of California [NDCAL]; District of Delaware [DDEL]; District of Massachusetts [DMASS]; District
of New Jersey [DNJ]; and Eastern District of Texas [EDTEX]. See supra Table 2.
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COMPONENT

WILLFUL

SOFTWARE

ELECTRONICS

ELECTRICAL

MECHANICAL

CHEMISTRY

DRUGS

MEDICALDEVICE

CDCAL

.06**

.04**

.02***

(.05)

(.04)

(.02)

1.89

1.76

1.46

(.83)

(.84)

(.76)

-

.65

.37

(.63)

(.41)

.92

.60

(.93)

(.66)

2.91

1.88

(4.52)

(3.11)

.29

.20

(.28)

(.22)

.28

.17

(.36)

(.23)

.84

1.18

(.97)

(1.55)

.13*

.06*

(.12)

(.07)

-

.69

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

(.77)
NDCAL

-

-

.61
(.60)

DDEL

-

-

.07***
(.05)

DMASS

-

-

1.03
(.97)

DNJ

-

-

1.39
(1.94)

EDTEX

-

-

1.76
(1.33)

1997

1998

IOWA LAW REVIEW
Pseudo R2

.31

.37

[Vol. 101:1949
.45

Not surprisingly, whether the patentee and infringer were competitors is
the single most significant factor related to injunctive relief in all three
models. This variable is highly statistically significant,298 and its predictive
power increases as control variables are added.299 Whether the patentee was a
PAE is also statistically significant in the expected direction (i.e., fewer
permanent injunctions were granted to PAEs) in the final model, which has
the highest degree of predictive power.300 However, the models probably tend
to underestimate the strength of the relationship between PAE status and
injunctive relief, as there is a high degree of collinearity between the PAE and
COMPETE variables301—by definition, a PAE cannot currently compete in a
product market against an infringer.302
In addition, whether a patent claims a “small component” of an
infringing product is statistically significant for injunctive relief.303 When a
patent is found to cover a small component, district courts rarely grant an
injunction, as reflected by the low odds ratio for this variable.304 Thus, it
appears that district courts are heeding Justice Kennedy’s advice to avoid
injunctive relief “[w]hen the patented invention is but a small component of
the product the [infringer] seek[s] to produce.”305
However, several other factors identified in the existing literature as
relevant to the injunction calculus appear not to be statistically significant
and/or do not have the anticipated impact. For instance, a patentee’s
willingness to license the patent(s)-in-suit is actually positively correlated with
injunctive relief after controlling for all other factors, although this finding is
not statistically significant.306 Similarly, a finding of willful infringement does

298.
p < 0.001 in all three models.
299.
The odds ratio for COMPETE increased from 13.49 in Model #1 to 27.68 in Model #3.
Similarly, the 95% confidence interval (not reported in Table 3) for the variable increased from
4.2043.38 in Model #1 to 6.62115.68 in Model #3.
300.
p = 0.035 in Model #3.
301.
p < 0.001 using Pearson’s chi-square (χ2) test.
302.
In two cases, PAEs were found to have competed in the past with the infringer. See i4i
Ltd. P’ship v. Microsoft Corp., 670 F. Supp. 2d 568, 599 (E.D. Tex. 2009) (finding that there was
evidence of direct competition between patentee and defendant within the custom XML marketplace,
but at the time of decision patentee’s primary business appeared to be patent licensing and litigation);
800 Adept, Inc. v. Murex Sec., Ltd., 505 F. Supp. 2d 1327, 1337 (M.D. Fla. 2007) (finding that “800
Adept and the Murex–Targus Parties are competitors in the market for telephone call routing
services”). Both patentees appeared to be engaged primarily in patent litigation by filing multiple
lawsuits in the Eastern District of Texas against at least twenty other defendants.
303.
p < 0.01 in Models #1 and #2, and p < 0.001 in Model #3.
304.
District courts only granted injunctions 14% of the time (2 of 14 cases) where the
district court found that the patent covered a “small component.”
305.
eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 396 (2006) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
306.
p = 0.125 in Model #3. Overall, patentees who have engaged in licensing efforts are

A5_SEAMAN (DO NOT DELETE)

2016]

7/8/2016 9:51 AM

PERMANENT INJUNCTIONS IN PATENT LITIGATION

1999

not have a statistically significant correlation with permanent injunction
decisions.307 Perhaps most notably, business method patents do not have a
statistically significant relationship with injunction denials,308 despite Justice
Kennedy’s concurring opinion expressing skepticism about the quality of
such patents.309
Two other variables have a statistically significant relationship with
injunction decisions in the second and third models. First, injunctions are
granted at a significantly lower rate in cases involving medical device
technology, even after controlling for the litigants’ status as competitors.310
This higher-than-anticipated injunction denial rate may be at least partly due
to the final eBay factor; several district court decisions have declined to award
injunctive relief on the basis that it would disserve the public interest to
restrict doctors’ and patients’ access to the infringing devices.311 Second, one
forum—the District of Delaware—was found to have a statistically significant
negative correlation with injunctive relief.312 This may be related to the fact
that Delaware is currently a preferred forum for PAE litigants, who rarely
obtain injunctive relief.313

slightly less likely to obtain a permanent injunction (64% of the time) than patentees who are
not (77% of the time).
307.
p = 0.470 in Model #3. Overall, patentees have a slightly higher injunction grant rate
against willful infringers (77% of the time) than against non-willful infringers (70%).
308.
p = 0.375 in Model #3. Prevailing patentees in business method cases win injunctions
slightly over half the time (53%), compared to almost three-quarters of the time in all other cases
(74%), but the small number of decisions involving business method patents (N = 17) renders
this difference statistically insignificant.
309.
eBay, 547 U.S. at 397 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
310.
p = 0.011 in Model #3.
311.
See, e.g., Tyco Healthcare Grp. LP v. Ethicon Endo–Surgery, Inc., 936 F. Supp. 2d 30,
86 (D. Conn. 2013) (finding it “an important consideration that a permanent injunction would
pull many devices that are presently used in surgery off the market”); Conceptus, Inc. v. Hologic,
Inc., No. C 09-02280 WHA, 2012 WL 44064, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 9, 2012) (finding that “the
public benefit of having two products with different qualities in the transcervical hysteroscopic
sterilization market militates strongly against an injunction”); Johnson & Johnson Vision Care,
Inc. v. CIBA Vision Corp., 712 F. Supp. 2d 1285, 1292–93 (M.D. Fla. 2010) (concluding “that
the public interest would be disserved if an injunction were to be entered” because “millions of
innocent contact lens wearers will suffer real adverse consequences if sale of [the infringing
contact lenses] is enjoined”); Bard Peripheral Vascular, Inc. v. W.L. Gore & Assocs. Inc., No. CV03-0597-PHX-MHM, 2009 WL 920300, at *5–6 (D. Ariz. Mar. 31, 2009) (finding the public
interest “weigh[s] heavily against imposing an injunction” because of “the public health
consequences of enjoining Gore from producing or selling its infringing products”); Reporter’s
Transcript of Proceedings at 7, Medtronic Sofamor Danek USA v. Nuvasive, Inc., No. 08-CV01512 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 26, 2012), ECF No. 461 (“[I]t appears to the Court that the potential risk
to patient health and safety is too great to justify enjoining NuVasive from continuing to sell its
infringing products.”).
312.
p < 0.001 in Model #3.
313.
See supra notes 234–35 and accompanying text.
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B. PATENTS DATASET
Multiple regression analysis also was performed on numerous variables
in the Patents Dataset to assess whether they had a statistically significant
relationship with injunctive relief. For example, prior studies have found that
patents with more claims,314 higher citations to prior art,315 more related
predecessor (parent) applications,316 and greater citations by subsequentlyissued patents (i.e., forward citations)317 are more likely to be asserted in
litigation and thus more likely to be considered valuable by their owners.318
Similarly, the length of time a patent is in prosecution has been correlated in
past studies with increased patent value.319 As a result, these variables were
anticipated to be positively correlated with injunctive relief, on the theory that
infringement of a valuable patent is more likely to result in irreparable harm.
In contrast, several other variables were anticipated to be negatively
correlated with an injunction. For instance, prior studies have found that
small entity status is negatively correlated with patent value,320 and small
entities are less likely to prevail in patent litigation.321 Moreover, since one
asserted justification for PAEs is that they assist small inventors in monetizing
their innovation, patents obtained by small entities may be more likely to be
acquired and asserted by PAEs,322 which rarely obtain injunctions. Similarly,
patents closer to expiration are less likely to be valuable than newly-acquired
patents,323 and so the time period between the patent’s issuance and the

314.
See Allison et al., supra note 160, at 451–53 (finding “that litigated patents include
significantly more claims than [non-litigated] patents,” and suggesting “that a larger number of
claims suggests the owners knew at the time of prosecution that these patents would turn out to
be important”); Chien, supra note 160, at 326 fig.6, 329 app. A (finding a statistically significant
relationship between the number of claims and whether a patent is litigated).
315.
See Allison et al., supra note 160, at 453 (finding that “[l]itigated patents . . . also cite
significantly more prior art than [non-litigated] patents”).
316.
See id. at 457 (“Litigated patents also tended to be part of ‘families’ of issued patents.”).
317.
See id. at 455 (“Patents that end up being litigated are much more likely to be cited as
prior art by other issued U.S. patents than are non-litigated patents. . . . Indeed, the number of
citations received has a particularly strong association with litigation.”); see also supra note 201.
318.
See James Bessen, The Value of U.S. Patents by Owner and Patent Characteristics, 37 RES.
POL’Y 932, 939 (2008) (“A litigated patent is, all else equal, nearly six times more valuable”); see
also Allison et al., supra note 160, at 437 (assuming “that litigated patents are at least a subset of
the most valuable patents . . . .”).
319.
See Allison et al., supra note 160, at 459 (“Litigated patents also spent significantly
longer in prosecution than issued patents.”).
320.
See Bessen, supra note 318, at 937 (finding that “patents owned by small entities are
dramatically less valuable than patents owned by large entities”).
321.
See John R. Allison et al., Patent Quality and Settlement Among Repeat Patent Litigants, 99
GEO. L.J. 677, 690 (2011) (finding that “large patent plaintiffs are significantly more likely than
small ones to win” in patent litigation).
322.
See Shrestha, supra note 239, at 127–28.
323.
See Allison et al., supra note 160, at 460 (“Litigation is more likely to occur when patents are
young . . . . Given the connection between litigation and value, it follows that the potential value of a
patent is known early on; it is rare for a patent to become valuable and be litigated late in its life.”)
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injunction decision was expected to be negatively correlated with injunction
grants.
A regression model incorporating these variables was created. In addition,
the NBER technology categories324 for each patent-in-suit were added as
controls,325 with one modification—the “Drugs and Medical” category was
divided into two separate categories because of the differences in injunction rates
observed in the Decisions Dataset.326 The odds ratios, standard errors, statistical
significance, and pseudo R2 are reported in Table 4.
Table 4. Logistic Regression: Patent Characteristics
Variable
Odds Ratio
CLAIMS

.998
(.004)

PRIORART

.998
(.002)

PARENT

.982
(.058)

FWDCITEPERYEAR

.997
(.018)

PROSECUTIONYEAR

1.032
(.060)

SMALL

1.591
(.509)

ISSUE2INJUNCTION

.965
(.027)

Pseudo R2

.071

In sum, none of the measured patent characteristics had a statistically
significant relationship with injunction outcomes. This was surprising in light

324.
See supra note 200 and accompanying text.
325.
Each of these technology categories was included in the regression model as dummy
variables. The odds ratios and standard errors for these variables are omitted from Table 4, but
they are included in the reported pseudo R2 statistic for goodness-of-fit.
326.
See supra Table 1 (showing permanent injunction grant rate is 92% for drugs and 65%
for medical devices).
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of the existing literature, which suggested these characteristics could have
predictive value.327 Indeed, the only variable in this model that had a
statistically significant relationship was one of the control variables, the NBER
technology category of Computers and Communications, which was
negatively correlated with injunctive relief.328
C. IMPLICATIONS
This study’s findings have several implications for both participants and
policy makers in the patent system. First, district courts have applied eBay in a
manner that awards permanent injunctions to operating companies who
compete with the infringer in the vast majority of cases, while simultaneously
denying them to most PAEs and non-competitors.329 This result holds even
after controlling for other potentially confounding factors, such as the field
of patented technology and courts where PAEs commonly file infringement
claims.330 In particular, the first factor of the eBay test appears to be the main
stumbling block for PAEs and other non-competing entities, as they rarely can
demonstrate the type of competition-related harm that qualifies as an
irreparable injury under existing precedent.331
Denying injunctive relief to PAEs may be normatively desirable in many
cases, such as patentees who engage in rent-seeking behavior by exploiting
the high transaction costs of patent litigation to extract nuisance-value
settlements without any corresponding public benefit.332 eBay’s four-factor test
apparently has helped mitigate holdup by such patentees,333 even if PAE
litigation remains widespread.334

327.
See supra note 160. But cf. Allison et al., supra note 170, at 1798–99 (finding that “the
observable characteristics of the patents[-in-suit] don’t seem to have much, if any, bearing on the
outcome of the cases involving those patents”).
328.
Odds ratio 0.448, standard error 0.169, p = 0.033.
329.
See supra notes 243–44 and accompanying text; see also Golden, Patent Trolls, supra note
4, at 2113–14 (asserting that “district courts’ post-eBay practice may be in some tension with the
Supreme Court’s warning against the ‘categorical denial of injunctive relief’ to broad classes of
patent holders”); Sandrik, supra note 4, at 97 (“Case law in the last five years has established a
near categorical rule that [non-practicing entities] cannot obtain injunctive relief.”).
330.
See supra note 301 and accompanying text.
331.
See supra Figure 5.
332.
See Mark A. Lemley & A. Douglas Melamed, Missing the Forest for the Trolls, 113 COLUM. L. REV.
2117, 2126 (2013) (referring to “bottom-feeder trolls” as patent owners that “rely on the high cost of
patent litigation” to induce alleged infringers to enter into “quick, low-value settlements”).
333.
See Chien & Lemley, supra note 2, at 2 (“By requiring federal courts to consider the
equities of a particular case before granting an injunction, eBay solved much of the patent
system’s holdup problem.”); Robert P. Merges, Foundations and Principles Redux: A Reply to Professor
Blankfein-Tabachnick, 101 CALIF. L. REV. 1361, 1373 (2013) (same).
334.
See Colleen V. Chien, Patent Trolls by the Numbers (Santa Clara Univ. Legal Studies, Research
Paper No. 08-13, 2013), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2233041 (finding that
PAEs initiated 62% of all patent litigation filed in 2012 based on data provided by RPX); cf. Cotropia
et al., supra note 184, at 676 fig.2 (finding that operating companies represented 68.9% of unique
patentees in patent cases filed in 2012).
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However, the near-categorical denial of injunctive relief to nonpracticing entities seemingly conflicts with the Supreme Court’s admonition
in eBay that lower courts should avoid “categorical rule[s]” prohibiting
injunctive relief “in a broad swath of cases,” including when the patentee does
not commercially practice its patents.335 As the Court’s unanimous opinion
explained, such “broad classifications” are not permitted by “traditional
equitable principles.”336 Furthermore, the routine denial of injunctive relief
to non-practicing entities is in tension with the Court’s century-old holding in
Continental Paper Bag—which was cited in eBay337—that a patentee’s failure to
practice the patented invention does not, standing alone, preclude equitable
relief.338
The imposition of a liability rule for most non-practicing patentees may
adversely affect entities that engage in innovation and utilize a business model
that relies heavily on the right to exclude others, such as startups that have
developed a new technology but have not yet brought a product to market.339
For many startups, the process of commercializing an invention is costly and
complex, with uncertain prospects for success.340 Empirical researchers have
found that many startup companies seek patents to secure rights to their
inventions, particularly in the biotechnology and medical device industries,341

335.
eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 393 (2006); see also Sandrik, supra note 4,
at 111 (contending that “[t]he denial of injunctive relief . . . to patentees that practice their technology
but do not compete in the same market as their infringers . . . is in conflict with the Supreme Courts
warning against the ‘categorical denial of injunctive relief’” (citations omitted)).
336.
eBay, 547 U.S. at 393.
337.
See id. (“The [district] court’s categorical rule is also in tension with [Continental Paper
Bag], which rejected the contention that a court of equity has no jurisdiction to grant injunctive
relief to a patent holder who has unreasonably declined to use the patent.” (citation omitted)).
338.
See supra notes 60–68 and accompanying text; see also Holte, Misinterpretation of eBay,
supra note 4, at 727 (noting “the Supreme Court affirmed the Continental Paper Bag case” in eBay).
339.
See Andrew Beckerman-Rodau, The Supreme Court Engages in Judicial Activism in
Interpreting the Patent Law in eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 10 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP.
165, 198 (2007) (“Nonpracticing entities can be small enterprises that have developed innovative
technology but have been unable to generate the necessary capital or marketing expertise to
compete successfully [in] the marketplace.”); see also Stuart J.H. Graham, Robert P. Merges, Pam
Samuelson & Ted Sichelman, High Technology Entrepreneurs and the Patent System: Results of the 2008
Berkeley Patent Survey, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1255, 1297 (2009) (finding that among surveyed
startups who apply for patent protection, “the most important reason for patenting is to prevent
others from copying the startup’s products and services”).
340.
See F. Scott Kieff, Property Rights and Property Rules for Commercializing Inventions, 85 MINN.
L. REV. 697, 707–08 (2001) (explaining the activities associated with commercializing an
invention, including developing a commercial embodiment, raising capital, securing production
facilities and labor, creating distribution channels, and informing potential consumers about the
product’s availability and benefits); Ted Sichelman, Commercializing Patents, 62 STAN. L. REV. 341,
343 (2010) (“[T]he inventor must undertake costly and risky development and testing to
transform the invention into a commercially viable product.”).
341.
See Graham et al., supra note 339, at 1277 tbl. 1 (showing that 39% of all surveyed
startups, and 75% of biotechnology and 76% of medical device startups, hold U.S. patents or
patent applications).
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and the vast majority of startups that successfully secure venture capital
financing have applied for patent protection.342 The effective loss of the right
to exclude post-eBay may hinder these firms’ ability to subsequently
commercialize their inventions.343
In addition, a liability rule may decrease the value of patents owned by
PAEs and other non-practicing entities. By removing the threat of a
permanent injunction, and thus the ability to potentially force infringing
products off the market, eBay has “decrease[d] the incentives for potential
licensees to seek a license rather than practice patents without permission.”344
The loss of the right to exclude erodes the patentee’s bargaining power and
consequently may result in lower licensing rates.345 Indeed, this second-order
effect is likely to have a much wider impact than injunction denials in
litigation, as only a small fraction of patents are ever litigated, while many
more are licensed.346
Third, district courts exhibit a technology-specific bias in applying the
facially-neutral four-factor test in eBay. This phenomenon is not uncommon
in patent law. As Dan Burk and Mark Lemley have explained, although
342.
See id. (showing that 82% of surveyed venture-backed companies either have at least
one U.S. patent or have applied for a U.S. patent, and that venture-backed firms hold an average
of 18.7 U.S. patents and patent applications); David H. Hsu & Rosemarie H. Ziedonis, Resources
as Dual Sources of Advantage: Implications for Valuing Entrepreneurial-Firm Patents, 34 STRATEGIC
MGMT. J. 761, 762 (2013) (finding “that successful patent filings are . . . influential determinants
of financing outcomes for new ventures” for semiconductor startups); see also Beckerman-Rodau,
supra note 338, at 199 (“Strong patent rights provide an incentive for enterprises, such as venture
capitalists, to provide capital to smaller enterprises . . . .”); Samuel Kortum & Josh Lerner,
Assessing the Contribution of Venture Capital to Innovation, 31 RAND J. ECON. 674, 674–75 (2000)
(finding that “venture capital is associated with a substantial increase in patenting” and suggesting
several models to explain this relationship); Celia Lerman, Patent Strategies of Technology
Startups: An Empirical Study 26-27 (May 25, 2015) (unpublished manuscript),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2610433 (finding in empirical study of
startups listed in CruchBase that “patents have a positive effect on funding” from investors and
that “the number of patents matters”).
343.
See Golden, Patent Trolls, supra note 4, at 2117 (“By discouraging innovation, and the
ownership of rights in innovation, by independent inventors, universities, technology start-ups,
research-oriented spin-offs, and patent holding companies, a categorically discriminatory market
for patent rights may slow, rather than promote, progress.”); Kieff, supra note 340, at 703 (“[T]he
treatment of patents as property rights is necessary to facilitate investment in the complex, costly,
and risky commercialization activities required to turn nascent inventions into new goods and
services.”); see also Ted Sichelman & Stuart J.H. Graham, Patenting by Entrepreneurs: An Empirical
Study, 17 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 111, 112 (2010) (explaining that “patents provide
substantial ex post incentives to commercialize inventions”).
344.
Ellis et al., supra note 4, at 459; see also Tang, supra note 135, at 250 (contending that
“[s]ince eBay drastically reduced the threat of permanent injunctions over large corporations’
core products or services, these corporations now have even less financial incentive to license
from non-practicing patent owners”).
345.
Ellis et al., supra note 4, at 460.
346.
See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, Essay, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 NW. U. L. REV.
1495, 1507 (2001) (asserting that “only about 1.5% of patents are litigated at all,” but estimating
that “the total number of patents litigated or licensed for a royalty (as opposed to a cross-license)
is on the order of [5%] of issued patents”).
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“patent law is technology-neutral in theory, it is technology-specific in
application.”347 In particular, Burk and Lemley point to how federal courts
apply various doctrines, such as nonobviousness, enablement, written
description, and best mode, differently in fields like biotechnology and
computer software.348 Injunctive relief appears to be another doctrine that fits
this description. In particular, it appears that industries which depend on
strong patent rights to encourage innovation—most notably biotechnology
and pharmaceuticals349—are the most likely to obtain injunctive relief.350
Notably, these industries also have extremely high research and development
costs, running into the hundreds of millions of dollars in some cases.351 In
contrast, injunctions are granted at lower rates for industries where patent
protection is viewed as less vital, such as computer software.352
Finally, differences in injunction rates by district open the possibility to
forum shopping by litigants who are concerned about their prospects for
injunctive relief.353 For example, although PAEs rarely receive injunctions,
three of the four decisions where they were able to do so were from the
Eastern District of Texas,354 which is a favored venue of non-practicing
entities.355 This finding may weigh in favor of adopting venue-limiting

347.
Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Is Patent Law Technology-Specific?, 17 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 1155, 1156 (2002).
348.
Id.; see also DAN L. BURK & MARK A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND HOW THE COURTS
CAN SOLVE IT 59–62 (2009) (advancing a similar argument).
349.
See BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 348, at 50 (discussing prior empirical work finding “that
patents play a major role in supporting innovation in only a few industries, most notably in
chemistry and pharmaceuticals”); Graham et al., supra note 339, at 1278 (finding that
“biotechnology and medical device companies are much more likely to hold patents and
applications than are software and Internet firms”); see also Edwin Mansfield, Patents and
Innovation: An Empirical Study, 32 MGMT. SCI. 173, 175 tbl.1 (1986) (finding in a cross-section
survey of firms that 65% percent of pharmaceutical innovations would not have been introduced
without patent protection).
350.
See supra Table 3 (finding pharmaceutical and biotechnology patents received
injunctions over 90% of the time).
351.
See Joseph A. DiMasi et al., The Price of Innovation: New Estimates of Drug Development Costs, 22 J.
HEALTH ECON. 151, 166–67, 167 fig.2 (2003) (finding that the total cost per FDA approved new drug
exceeds $800 million); see also JOSEPH A. DIMASI, TUFTS CTR. FOR THE STUDY OF DRUG DEV.,
INNOVATION IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY: NEW ESTIMATES OF R&D COSTS (2014),
http://csdd.tufts.edu/files/uploads/Tufts_CSDD_briefing_on_RD_cost_study_-_Nov_18,_2014..pdf
(finding in updated study that estimated average pre-tax industry costs per new prescription drug
approval exceeds $2.5 billion).
352.
See Graham et al., supra note 339, at 1278 (finding that most startup software firms hold
no patents).
353.
See supra Table 2 (describing differential grant rates by district).
354.
See, e.g., i4i Ltd. P’ship v. Microsoft Corp., 670 F. Supp. 2d 568, 608 (E.D. Tex. 2009);
Final Judgment and Permanent Injunction, Anascape Ltd. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., No. 9:06-CV158 (E.D. Tex. July 23, 2008), ECF No. 384; Commonwealth Sci. & Indus. Research Organisation
v. Buffalo Tech. Inc., 492 F. Supp. 2d 600, 607–08 (E.D. Tex. 2007).
355.
See supra note 235.
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provisions for patent cases in district courts, as currently proposed in some
versions of patent reform legislation.356
VI. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court decision in eBay has ushered in a new era in patent
remedies by creating a bifurcated system of property rules and liability rules
for different categories of patentees. Little has changed for prevailing
patentees who compete in a product market against an infringer, as they still
obtain permanent injunctions in the vast majority of cases. In contrast, PAEs
are generally subject to a liability rule because they rarely can obtain an
injunction at the trial court level. This dichotomy may have a negative impact
on certain types of non-practicing entities by effectively eliminating their right
to exclude others from practicing the patented technology. Moreover, it
appears to conflict with the Court’s own conclusion in eBay that such a
“categorical rule” is inappropriate in determining entitlement to equitable
relief.

Appendix A:
List of Injunction Decisions
Plaintiff

Defendant

Court

Docket

Cite

Date

356.
See Venue Equity and Non-Uniformity Elimination (VENUE) Act of 2016, S. 2733,
114th Cong. § 2(a) (proposed amendment to 35 U.S.C. § 1400(b)); Amendment in the Nature
of a Substitute to H.R. 9, 114th Cong. § 281B(g) (2015) (proposed amendment to 35 U.S.C.
§ 1400(b)), https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/house-bill/9/text.
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Briese
Lichttechnik
Verttriebs
GmbH

Langton

NYSD

1:09-CV-09890

ECF No. 477

12-18-2013

XpertUniverse,
Inc.

Cisco Sys., Inc.

DED

1:09-CV-00157

2013 WL 6118447

11-20-2013

TransPerfect
Global, Inc.

MotionPoint
Corp.

CAND

4:10-CV-02590

ECF No. 468

11-15-2013

Global Traffic
Techs., LLC

Emtrac Sys, Inc.

MND

0:10-CV-04110

2013 WL 5964454

11-08-2013

Bristol-Myers
Squibb Co.

Mylan Pharms.,
Inc.

DED

1:09-CV-00651

ECF Nos. 242, 243

11-05-2013

CardSoft, Inc.

VeriFone
Holdings, Inc.

TXED

2:08-CV-00098

2013 WL 5862762

10-30-2013

WBIP, LLC

Kohler Co.

MAD

1:11-CV-10374

ECF No. 257

08-12-2013

Stryker Corp.

Zimmer Inc.

MIWD

1:10-CV-01223

2013 WL 6231533

08-07-2013

Smith &
Nephew, Inc.

Interlace Med.,
Inc.

MAD

1:10-CV-10951

955 F. Supp. 2d 69

06-27-2013

WesternGeco
L.L.C.

ION Geophysical
Corp.

TXSD

4:09-CV-01827

953 F. Supp. 2d 731

06-19-2013

Halo Elecs., Inc.

Pulse Elecs., Inc.

NVD

2:07-CV-00331

2013 WL 3043668

06-17-2013

Alps South, LLC

The Ohio Willow
Wood Co.

FLMD

8:08-CV-01893

ECF No. 418

05-09-2013

Allergan, Inc.

Apotex Inc. et al.

NCMD

1:10-CV-00681

2013 WL 1750757

04-23-2013

Unicom
Monitoring,
LLC

Cencom, Inc.

NJD

3:06-CV-01166

2013 WL 1704300

04-19-2013

DED

1:10-MD-02200

939 F. Supp. 2d 456

03-30-2013

In re
Armodafinil
Patent Litigation
(‘722 Patent
Litigation)
Tyco Healthcare
Group LP

Ethicon EndoSurgery Inc.

CTD

3:10-CV-00060

936 F. Supp. 2d 30

03-28-2013

VirnetX Inc.

Apple Inc.

TXED

6:10-CV-00417

925 F. Supp. 2d 816

02-26-2013

Brocade
Commc’ns Sys.
Inc.

A10 Networks,
Inc.

CAND

5:10-CV-03428

2013 WL 140039

01-10-2013
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Apple, Inc.

Samsung Elecs.
Co., Ltd.

CAND

5:11-CV-01846

909 F. Supp. 2d 1147

12-17-2012

E2Interactive,
Inc.

Blackhawk
Network, LLC

WIWD

3:09-CV-00629

ECF No. 536

12-06-2012

Graphic
Packaging
Intern., Inc.

C.W. Zumbiel Co.

FLMD

3:10-CV-00891

2012 WL 3536983

08-15-2012

Coloplast A/S

Generic Med.
Devices, Inc.

WAWD

2:10-CV-00227

2012 WL 3262756

08-09-2012

Carl Zeiss Vision
Int’l GmbH

Signet Armorlite,
Inc.

CASD

3:07-CV-00894

ECF No. 1561

08-06-2012

Teva Pharms.
USA

Sandoz, Inc.

NYSD

1:08-CV-07611

ECF No. 338

07-24-2012

Integrated Tech.
Corp.

Rudolph Techs.,
Inc.

AZD

2:06-CV-02182

ECF No. 546

07-23-2012

Pfizer Inc.

Teva Pharms.
U.S.A., Inc.

DED

1:09-CV-00307

882 F. Supp. 2d 643

07-19-2012

Gen. Elec. Co.

Mitsubishi Heavy
Indus. Ltd.

TXND

3:10-CV-00276

ECF No. 640

07-09-2012

Valeant Int’l

Watson Pharms.,
Inc.

FLSD

1:10-CV-20526

ECF No. 198

07-09-2012

Fractus, S.A.

Samsung Elecs.
Co.

TXED

6:09-CV-00203

876 F. Supp. 2d 802

06-28-2012

Apple, Inc.

Motorola, Inc.

ILND

1:11-CV-08540

869 F. Supp. 2d 901

06-22-2012

Motorola, Inc.

Apple, Inc.

ILND

1:11-CV-08540

869 F. Supp. 2d 901

06-22-2012

St. Jude Med.
Inc.

Access Closure
Inc.

ARWD

4:08-CV-04101

ECF No. 359

06-04-2012

Research
Found. of State
Univ. of NY

Mylan Pharm.

NJD

1:09-CV-00184

2012 WL 1901267

05-25-2012

Schering Corp.

Mylan Pharm.

NJD

2:09-CV-06383

ECF No. 455

05-17-2012

Layne
Christensen Co.

Bro-Tech Corp.
d/b/a The
Purolite Co.

KSD

2:09-CV-02381

871 F. Supp. 2d 1104

05-16-2012

Hospira, Inc.

Sandoz Int’l
GmbH

NJD

3:09-CV-04591

2012 WL 1587688

05-04-2012

Meadwestvaco
Corp.

Rexam PLC

VAED

1:10-CV-00511

ECF No. 597

04-12-2012
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Broadcom Corp.

Emulex Corp.

CACD

8:09-CV-01058

ECF No. 1090

03-16-2012

Medtronic
Sofamor Danek
USA, Inc.,

Nuvasive, Inc.

CASD

3:08-CV-01512

ECF Nos. 460, 461

01-26-2012

Conceptus, Inc.

Hologic, Inc.

CAND

3:09-CV-02280

2012 WL 44064

01-09-2012

Accentra, Inc.

Staples, Inc.

CACD

2:07-CV-05862

851 F. Supp. 2d 1205

12-19-2011

Eli Lilly and
Company

Actavis

NJD

2:07-CV-03770

ECF No. 748

12-06-2011

ActiveVideo
Networks, Inc.

Verizon
Communications,
Inc.

VAED

2:10-CV-00248

827 F. Supp. 2d 641

11-23-2011

Hurricane
Shooters, LLC

EMI Yoshi Inc.

FLMD

8:10-CV-00762

ECF No.. 144

11-18-2011

The Paw Wash
LLC

Paw Plunger LLC

MOWD

4:08-CV-00113

ECF No. 44

11-15-2011

Sanofi-Aventis
Deutschland
GmbH

Glenmark
Pharms., Inc. USA

NJD

2:07-CV-05855

821 F. Supp. 2d 681

09-30-2011

Versata Software
Inc.

SAP Am., Inc.

TXED

2:07-CV-00153

2011 WL 4017944

09-09-2011

Lighting Ballast
Control LLC

Philips Elecs. N.
Am. Corp.

TXND

7:09-CV-00029

814 F. Supp. 2d 665

08-26-2011

Belden Tech.
Inc.

Superior Essex
Communications
LP

DED

1:08-CV-00063

802 F. Supp. 2d 555

08-12-2011

Peach State
Labs, Inc.

Envtl. Mfg.
Solutions, LLC

FLMD

6:09-CV-00395

ECF No. 276

08-12-2011

Pozen Inc.

Par Pharma. Inc.

TXED

6:08-CV-00437

800 F. Supp. 2d 789

08-05-2011

Inventio AG

Otis Elevator Co.

NYSD

1:06-CV-05377

2011 WL 3480946

08-04-2011

Midtronics Inc.

Aurora
Performance

ILND

1:06-CV-03917

800 F. Supp. 2d 970;
ECF No. 196

08-03-2011

Soitec

MEMC Elec.
Materials, Inc.

DED

1:08-CV-00292

2011 WL 2748725

07-13-2011

LG Elecs. USA
Inc.

Whirlpool Corp.

DED

1:08-CV-00234

798 F. Supp. 2d 541

07-01-2011

Metso Minerals
Inc.

Powerscreen Int’l
Distrib. Ltd.

NYED

2:06-CV-01446

788 F. Supp. 2d 71

05-26-2011
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ePlus, Inc.

Lawson Software,
Inc.

VAED

3:09-CV-00620

2011 WL 2119410

05-23-2011

3D Sys., Inc.

Envisiontec, Inc.

MIED

2:05-CV-74891

ECF Nos. 307, 309

04-25-2011

B. Braun
Melsungen AG

Terumo Corp.

DED

1:09-CV-00347

778 F. Supp. 2d 506

04-21-2011

WhitServe LLC

Computer
Packages, Inc.

CTD

3:06-CV-01935

ECF No. 481

03-30-2011

Douglas
Dynamics, LLC

Buyers Prods. Co.

WIWD

3:09-CV-00261

ECF No. 530

02-28-2011

Harris Corp.

Fed. Express
Corp.

FLMD

6:07-CV-01819

ECF No. 302; 2011
WL 3627379

02-28-2011

Affinity Labs of
Texas LLC

BMW N. Am.,
LLC

TXED

9:08-CV-00164

ECF No. 551

01-26-2011

K-Tec

Vita-Mix

UTD

2:06-CV-00108

765 F. Supp. 2d 1304

01-26-2011

Ernie Ball Inc.

Earvana

CACD

5:06-CV-00384

2011 WL 201816

01-21-2011

Brigham and
Women’s
Hospital, Inc.

Teva Pharms.

DED

1:08-CV-00464

ECF No. 262

01-07-2011

Bendix Comm.
Veh. Sys. Inc.

Haldex Brake
Prods. Corp.

OHND

1:09-CV-00176

2011 WL 14372

01-03-2011

Otsuka Pharm.

Sandoz, Inc.

NJD

3:07-CV-01000

2010 WL 4596324

11-15-2010

Robert Bosch,
LLC

Pylon Mfg. Co.

DED

1:08-CV-00542

748 F. Supp. 2d 383

11-03-2010

Stone Strong,
LLC

Delzotto Prods. of
Fla., Inc.

FLMD

5:08-CV-00503

2010 WL 4259371

10-25-2010

Streck, Inc.

Research &
Diagnostic Sys.,
Inc.

NED

8:06-CV-00458

ECF No. 386

09-30-2010

O2 Micro Int’l
Ltd.

Beyond
Innovation Tech.
Co.

TXED

2:04-CV-00032

2010 WL 8753254;
ECF No. 424

09-27-2010

Input/Output,
Inc. (ION)

Sercel, Inc.

TXED

5:06-CV-00236

2010 WL 3911378

09-16-2010

Marine Polymer
Techs., Inc.

HemCon Inc.

NHD

1:06-CV-00100

ECF No. 439

09-16-2010

ReedHycalog
UK, Ltd.

Diamond
Innovations Inc.

TXED

6:08-CV-00325

2010 WL 3238312

08-12-2010
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ClearValue, Inc.

Pearl River
Polymers, Inc.

TXED

6:06-CV-00197

735 F. Supp. 2d 560

08-12-2010

Soverain
Software LLC

Newegg, Inc.

TXED

6:07-CV-00511

836 F. Supp. 2d 462

08-11-2010

Retractable
Techs., Inc.

Occupational &
Med. Innovations,
Ltd. (OMI)

TXED

6:08-CV-00120

2010 WL 3199624

08-11-2010

Alcon, Inc.

Teva Pharms.
USA, Inc.

DED

1:06-CV-00234

2010 WL 3081327

08-05-2010

DED

1:08-MD-01941

ECF No. 176

08-03-2010

In re Alfuzosin
Hydrochloride
Patent Litig.
Dow Chem.
Corp.

Nova Chems.
Corp.

DED

1:05-CV-00737

2010 WL 3083023

07-30-2010

Custom Designs
of Nashville Inc.

Alsa Corp.

TNMD

3:08-CV-00665

727 F. Supp. 2d 719

07-27-2010

Cordance Corp.

Amazon.com, Inc.

DED

1:06-CV-00491

730 F. Supp. 2d 333

07-22-2010

Woods

Deangelo Marine
Exhaust, Inc.

FLSD

9:08-CV-81569

ECF No. 260

06-30-2010

Mitsubushi
Chem. Corp.

Barr Laboratories

NYSD

1:07-CV-11614

ECF No. 118

06-30-2010

LaserDynamics
Inc.

Quanta
Computer, Inc.

TXED

2:06-CV-00348

2010 WL 2574059

06-22-2010

Smith &
Nephew Inc.

Arthrex, Inc.

TXED

2:07-CV-00335

2010 WL 2522428

06-18-2010

Richter

Supa Tech.

NVD

2:08-CV-00005

ECF No. 145

05-28-2010

Retractable
Techs., Inc.

Becton, Dickinson
& Co.

TXED

2:07-CV-00250

2010 WL 9034911

05-19-2010

Tyco Healthcare
Group LP et al

Applied Medical
Resources Group

TXED

9:09-CV-00176

ECF No. 138

05-17-2010

Parker-Hannifin
Corp.

Wix Filtration
Corp.

OHND

1:07-CV-01374

ECF No. 236

05-03-2010

Humanscale
Corp.

CompX Int’l Inc.

VAED

3:09-CV-00086

2010 WL 1779963

04-29-2010

Johnson &
Johnson Vision
Care

CIBA Vision Corp.

FLMD

3:05-CV-00135

712 F. Supp. 2d 1285

04-27-2010
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Ricoh Co.

Quanta Computer
Inc.

WIWD

3:06-CV-00462

2010 WL 1607908

04-19-2010

Presidio
Components

Amer. Tech.
Ceramics

CASD

3:08-CV-00335

723 F. Supp. 2d 1284

04-13-2010

Judkins

HT Window
Fashions Corp.

PAWD

2:07-CV-00251

704 F. Supp. 2d 470

03-31-2010

Eli Lilly & Co.

Sicor Pharms, Inc.

INSD

1:06-CV-00238

705 F. Supp. 2d 971

03-31-2010

Arlington Indus.
Inc.

Bridgeport
Fittings, Inc.

PAMD

3:01-CV-00485

2010 WL 817519

03-09-2010

Mytee Prods.,
Inc.

Harris Research,
Inc.

CASD

3:06-CV-01854

ECF No. 277

01-20-2010

Emcore Corp.

Optium Corp.

PAWD

2:07-CV-00326

2010 WL 235126

01-15-2010

Innovention
Toys, LLC

MGA Entm’t, Inc.

LAED

2:07-CV-06510

ECF No. 220

01-13-2010

I-Flow Corp.

Apex Med. Tech.,
Inc

CASD

3:07-CV-01200

2010 WL 141402

01-08-2010

IGT

Bally Gaming Int’l
Inc.

DED

1:06-CV-00282

675 F. Supp. 2d 487

12-22-2009

Creative
Internet
Advertising
Corp.

Yahoo Inc.

TXED

6:07-CV-00354

674 F. Supp. 2d 847

12-09-2009

Japan Cash
Machine Co.

MEI, Inc.

NVD

2:05-CV-01433

ECF No. 374

11-03-2009

CumminsAllison Corp

SBM Co., Ltd.

TXED

9:07-CV-00196

ECF Nos. 219, 221

10-30-2009

Monsanto Co.

Bowman

INSD

2:07-CV-00283

686 F. Supp. 2d 834

09-30-2009

The Western
Union Co.

Moneygram
International

TXWD

1:07-CV-00372

2009 WL 8660103

09-30-2009

Eli Lilly & Co.

Teva Pharms.
USA, Inc.

INSD

1:06-CV-01017

657 F. Supp. 2d 967

09-23-2009

Flexiteek Ams.,
Inc.

PlasTEAK, Inc.

FLSD

0:08-CV-60996

2009 WL 2957310

09-15-2009

Spectralytics Inc.

Cordis Corp.

MND

0:05-CV-01464

650 F. Supp. 2d 900

09-04-2009

Unigene Labs.,
Inc.

Apotex Inc. et al.

NYSD

1:06-CV-05571

2009 WL 2762706

08-31-2009
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August Tech.
Corp.

Camtek Ltd.

MND

0:05-CV-01396

ECF No. 547

08-28-2009

Merck Sharp &
Dohme Pharm.
SRL

Teva Pharm. USA,
Inc.

NJD

3:07-CV-01596

2009 WL 3153316

08-19-2009

Finjan Software
Ltd.

Secure
Computing Corp.

DED

1:06-CV-00369

2009 WL 2524495

08-17-2009

i4i LP

Microsoft Corp.

TXED

6:07-CV-00113

670 F. Supp. 2d 568

08-11-2009

Daiichi Sankyo
Co., Ltd.

Mylan Pharms.

NJD

2:06-CV-03462

ECF No. 143

08-06-2009

Medtronic
Sofamor Danek
USA, Inc.,

Globus Med., Inc.

PAED

2:06-CV-04248

637 F. Supp. 2d 290

07-17-2009

iLight Techs.,
Inc.

Fallon Luminous
Prods. Corp.

TNMD

2:06-CV-00025

ECF No. 314

07-02-2009

Transamerica
Life Ins. Co.

Lincoln Nat’l Life
Ins. Co.

IAND

1:06-CV-00110

625 F. Supp. 2d 702

06-08-2009

Haemonetics
Corp.

Baxter Healthcare
Corp.

MAD

1:05-CV-12572

ECF No. 328

06-01-2009

Hypoxico Inc.

Colorado Altitude
Training

NYSD

1:02-CV-06191

630 F. Supp. 2d 319

05-29-2009

Koninklijke
Philips Elecs.
NV

Power Media CD
Tek, Inc.

CACD

2:07-CV-04788

ECF No. 176

05-21-2009

Mass Eng’d
Design

Ergotron, Inc.

TXED

2:06-CV-00272

633 F. Supp. 2d 361

04-17-2009

Bard Peripheral
Vascular

W.L. Gore &
Assocs., Inc.

AZD

2:03-CV-00597

2009 WL 920300

03-31-2009

Kowalski

Mommy Gina
Tuna Resources

HID

1:06-CV-00182

2009 WL 856006

03-30-2009

Joyal Prods., Inc.

Johnson Elec. N.
Am., Inc.

NJD

3:04-CV-05172

2009 WL 512156

02-27-2009

Hynix
Semiconductor,
Inc.

Rambus Inc.

CAND

5:00-CV-20905

609 F. Supp. 2d 951

02-23-2009

Global Traffic
Techs. LLC

Tomar Elecs., Inc.

MND

0:05-CV-00756

ECF No. 374

01-23-2009

U.S. Philips
Corp.

Iwasaki Elec. Co

NYSD

1:03-CV-00172

607 F. Supp. 2d 470

01-13-2009
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Ariba Inc.

Emptoris Inc.

TXED

9:07-CV-00090

ECF No. 329

01-07-2009

Telcordia
Techs., Inc.

Cisco Sys., Inc.

DED

1:04-CV-00876

592 F. Supp. 2d 727

01-06-2009

Funai Elec. Co.,
Ltd.

Daewoo Elecs.
Corp.

CAND

3:04-CV-01830

593 F. Supp. 2d 1088

01-05-2009

Sensormatic
Elec. Corp.

The Tag Co.

FLSD

9:06-CV-81105

632 F. Supp. 2d 1147

12-19-2008

Vertical Doors
Inc.

J.T. Bonn Inc.

CACD

8:05-CV-00905

ECF No. 468

12-15-2008

Power
Integrations,
Inc.

Fairchild
Semiconductor
Intern.

DED

1:04-CV-01371

2008 WL 5210843

12-12-2008

Smith &
Nephew Inc.

Arthrex Inc.

ORD

3:04-CV-00029

629 F. Supp. 2d 1176

12-03-2008

American Calcar
Inc.

American Honda
Motor Co.

CASD

3:06-CV-02433

ECF No. 548

11-18-2008

Callaway Golf
Co.

Acushnet Co.

DED

1:06-CV-00091

585 F. Supp. 2d 600

11-10-2008

Cam Guard Sys.,
Inc.

Smart Sys. Techs,
Inc.

CACD

8:07-CV-01051

ECF No. 226

11-10-2008

Becton
Dickinson Co.

Tyco Healthcare

DED

1:02-CV-01694

2008 WL 4745882

10-31-2008

Extreme
Networks, Inc.

Enterasys
Networks, Inc.

WIWD

3:07-CV-00229

2008 WL 4756498

10-29-2008

Advanced
Cardiovascular
Sys., Inc.

Medtronic
Vascular, Inc.

DED

1:98-CV-00080

579 F. Supp. 2d 554

09-26-2008

Gemtron Corp.

Saint-Gobain
Corp.

MIWD

1:04-CV-00387

ECF No. 831

09-23-2008

Pressure Prods.
Med. Supplies
Inc.

Quan Emerteq
Corp.

TXED

9:06-CV-00121

ECF Nos. 247, 248

08-20-2008

TruePosition,
Inc.

Andrew Corp.

DED

1:05-CV-00747

568 F. Supp. 2d 500

07-31-2008

Emory Univ.

Nova Biogentics

GAND

1:06-CV-00141

2008 WL 2945476

07-25-2008

Anascape, Ltd.

Nintendo of Am.

TXED

9:06-CV-00158

ECF Nos. 384, 395

07-23-2008

Grantley Patent
Holding, Ltd.

Clear Channel
Communications,
Inc.

TXED

9:06-CV-00259

ECF Nos. 244, 245

06-10-2008
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Trading Tech.
Int’l

eSpeed

ILND

1:04-CV-05312

2008 WL 4531371

05-22-2008

Kowalski

Ocean Duke
Corp.

HID

1:04-CV-00055

ECF No. 270

04-30-2008

Power-One, Inc.

Artesyn Techs.,
Inc. (Emerson)

TXED

2:05-CV-00463

2008 WL 1746636

04-11-2008

Fresenius USA,
Inc.

Baxter Int’l Inc.

CAND

4:03-CV-01431

2008 WL 928496

04-04-2008

Chase Med.,
L.P.

CHF Techs., Inc.

TXND

3:04-CV-02570

ECF No. 311

04-02-2008

Ecolab, Inc.

FMC Corp.

MND

0:05-CV-00831

ECF No. 529

04-02-2008

Orion IP, LLC

Mercedes-Benz
USA

TXED

6:05-CV-00322

2008 WL 8856865

03-28-2008

Avid
Identification
Sys.

Philips Elecs. N.
Am. Corp.

TXED

2:04-CV-00183

2008 WL 819962

03-25-2008

Blackboard Inc.

Desire2Learn Inc.

TXED

9:06-CV-00155

ECF No. 363

03-11-2008

Amgen

F. HoffmanLaRoche Ltd.

MAD

1:05-CV-12237

ECF No. 1675; 581 F.
Supp. 2d 160

02-28-2008

Cygnus
Telecommunica
tions Tech., LLC

WorldPort
Communications

CAND

5:02-CV-00144

2008 WL 506182

02-22-2008

ResQNet.com,
Inc.

Lansa, Inc.

NYSD

1:01-CV-03578

533 F. Supp. 2d 397

02-01-2008

Respironics, Inc.

Invacare Corp.

PAWD

2:04-CV-00336

2008 WL 111983

01-07-2008

Broadcom Corp.

Qualcomm, Inc.

CACD

8:05-CV-00467

ECF No. 996

12-31-2007

DePuy Spine,
Inc.

Medtronic
Sofamor Danek,
Inc.

MAD

1:01-CV-10165

ECF Nos. 581, 585

12-21-2007

Celerity, Inc.

Ultra Clean
Holding Inc.

CAND

3:05-CV-04374

ECF No. 551

11-30-2007

Acumed, LLC

Stryker Corp.

ORD

3:04-CV-00513

2007 WL 4180682

11-20-2007

Martek
Biosciences
Corp.

Nutrinova, Inc.

DED

1:03-CV-00896

520 F. Supp. 2d 537

10-30-2007

Sundance, Inc.

DeMonte
Fabricating Ltd.

MIED

2:02-CV-73543

2007 WL 3053662

10-19-2007
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Koninklijke
Philips Elecs.
NV

Int’l Disc Mfrs.

CACD

2:06-CV-02468

ECF No. 302

10-10-2007

Baden Sports,
Inc.

Kabushiki Kaisha
Molten

WAWD

2:06-CV-00210

2007 WL 2790777

09-25-2007

Telecomm. Sys,
Inc.

Mobile 365, Inc.

EDVA

3:06-CV-00485

ECF No. 224

09-04-2007

Allan Block
Corp.

E. Dillon & Co.

MND

0:04-CV-03511

509 F. Supp. 2d 795

08-20-2007

Johns Hopkins
Univ.

Datascope Corp.

MDD

1:05-CV-00759

513 F. Supp. 2d 578

08-09-2007

Muniauction,
Inc.

Thomson Corp.

PAWD

2:01-CV-01003

502 F. Supp. 2d 477

07-31-2007

MercExchange,
LLC

eBay, Inc.

VAED

2:01-CV-00736

500 F. Supp. 2d 556

07-27-2007

Diomed, Inc.

Angiodynamics,
Inc.

MAD

1:04-CV-10019

ECF No. 287

07-02-2007

SanofiSynthelabo

Apotex, Inc.

NYSD

1:02-CV-02255

492 F. Supp. 2d 353

06-19-2007

Commonwealth
Sci. & Indus.
Res. Org.
(CSIRO)

Buffalo Tech.
(USA), Inc.

TXED

6:06-CV-00324

492 F. Supp. 2d 600

06-15-2007

Brooktrout, Inc.

Eicon Networks
Corp.

TXED

2:03-CV-00059

2007 WL 1730112

06-14-2007

Heuft
Systemtechnik
GmbH

Indus. Dynamics
Co.

CACD

2:05-CV-06299

ECF No. 314

06-08-2007

Lexion Med Inc.

Northgate Techs.
Inc.

ILND

1:04-CV-05705

ECF No. 236

05-29-2007

Informatica
Corp.

Business Objects
Data Integration,
Inc.

CAND

3:02-CV-03378

ECF No. 694

05-16-2007

Proveris
Scientific Corp.

Innovasystems,
Inc.

MAD

1:05-CV-12424

ECF No. 150

05-11-2007

MGM Well
Servs., Inc.

Mega Lift Sys.,
LLC

TXSD

4:05-CV-01634

505 F. Supp. 2d 359

04-25-2007

800 Adept, Inc.

Murex Securities,
Ltd.

FLMD

6:02-CV-01354

505 F. Supp. 2d 1327

04-12-2007

Praxair, Inc.

ATMI, Inc.

DED

1:03-CV-01158

479 F. Supp. 2d 440

03-27-2007
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O2 Micro Int’l,
Ltd.

Beyond
Innovation Tech.
Co., Ltd.

TXED

2:04-CV-00032

2007 WL 869576

03-21-2007

Ortho-McNeil
Pharm., Inc.

Mylan Labs Inc.

NJD

2:04-CV-01689

2007 WL 869545

03-20-2007

Amado

Microsoft Corp.

CACD

8:03-CV-00242

ECF No. 661

03-13-2007

Verizon Servs.
Corp.

Vonage Holdings
Corp.

VAED

1:06-CV-00682

ECF No. 549

03-08-2007

Atlanta
Attachment Co.

Leggett & Platt,
Inc.

GAND

1:05-CV-01071

2007 WL 5011980

02-23-2007

Momentus Golf,
Inc.

Swingrite Golf
Corp.

IASD

4:02-CV-40252

ECF No. 224

02-16-2007

Novozymes A/S

Genencor Int’l,
Inc.

DED

1:05-CV-00160

474 F. Supp. 2d 592

02-16-2007

Genlyte Thomas
Group LLC

Arch. Lighting
Group

MAD

1:05-CV-10945

ECF No. 80

02-05-2007

MPT, Inc.

Marathon Labels,
Inc.

OHND

1:04-CV-02357

505 F. Supp. 2d 401

01-19-2007

Exergen Corp.

CVS Corp.

MAD

1:01-CV-11306

ECF No. 256

01-12-2007

Innogenetics,
N.V.

Abbott Labs.

WIWD

3:05-CV-00575

578 F. Supp. 2d 1079;
2007 WL 5431017

01-12-2007

IMX, Inc.

LendingTree, Inc.

DED

1:03-CV-01067

469 F. Supp. 2d 203

01-10-2007

Transocean
Offshore
Deepwater
Drilling, Inc.

GlobalSantaFe
Corp.

TXSD

4:03-CV-02910

2006 WL 3813778

12-27-2006

Visto Corp.

Seven Networks,
Inc.

TXED

2:03-CV-00333

2006 WL 3741891

12-19-2006

Cybersettle, Inc.

Nat’l Arbitration
Forum, Inc.

NJD

3:04-CV-04744

ECF No. 73; 2006 WL
3256824

12-18-2006

Black & Decker
Inc.

Robert Bosch
Tool Corp.

ILND

1:04-CV-07955

2006 WL 3446144

11-20-2006

Color Kinetics,
Inc.

Super Vision Int’l,
Inc.

MAD

1:02-CV-11137

ECF No. 266

11-08-2006

Omegaflex, Inc.

Parker Hannifin
Corp.

MAD

3:02-CV-30022

ECF No. 142

10-19-2006

Janssen Pharm.

Dr. Reddy’s
Laboratories

NJD

2:03-CV-06185

ECF No. 92

10-13-2006
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Rosco, Inc.

Mirror Lite Co.

NYED

1:96-CV-05658

2006 WL 2844400

09-29-2006

Smith &
Nephew, Inc.

Synthes (U.S.A.)

TNWD

2:02-CV-02873

466 F. Supp. 2d 978

09-28-2006

3M Innovative
Properties Co.

Avery Dennison
Corp.

MND

0:01-CV-01781

2006 WL 2735499

09-25-2006

Int’l Rectifier

IXYS Corp.

CACD

2:00-CV-06756

ECF Nos. 689, 690

09-14-2006

Voda

Cordis Corp.

OKWD

5:03-CV-01512

2006 WL 2570614

09-05-2006

Finisar Corp.

DirecTV Group
Inc.

TXED

1:05-CV-00264

2006 WL 2037617

09-01-2006

Pods, Inc.

Porta Stor, Inc.

FLMD

8:04-CV-02101

ECF No. 209

08-25-2006

Litecubes, LLC

Northern Light
Prods., Inc.

MOED

4:04-CV-00485

2006 WL 5700252

08-25-2006

TiVo

Echostar (Dish
Network)

TXED

2:04-CV-00001

446 F. Supp. 2d 664

08-17-2006

Paice LLC

Toyota Motor
Corp.

TXED

2:04-CV-00211

2006 WL 2385139

08-16-2006

Brinton

Loggans

TNMD

3:04-CV-00177

ECF Nos. 153, 154,
160

08-06-2006

Wald

Mudhopper
Oilfield Servs.,
Inc.

OKWD

5:04-CV-01693

2006 WL 2128851

07-27-2006

z4

Microsoft Corp.

TXED

6:06-CV-00142

434 F. Supp. 2d 437

06-14-2006

